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 1 
Summary 
The European Commission has, in recent years, adopted an economic, 
consumer welfare-driven approach in its competition policy. Since the 
“modernisation” of the European competition law in 2004, the Commission 
has stated that “objective economic benefits” are necessary for the 
exemption in Article 101(3) TFEU to apply. While the Commission in the 
past may have taken environmental consideration into account in its 
competitive assessments, economic efficiency has become the paramount 
goal of EU competition policy. It may seem like decision-makers no longer 
are able to consider non-economic concerns when assessing anti-
competitive agreements. Meanwhile, environmental law academics stress 
the importance of “market-based instruments” and the need for private 
cooperation to combat environmental decay. An increasing number of firms 
seek to do business in a way that minimises their environmental impact. 
Often, such initiatives require a certain degree of collaboration. The scope 
of Article 101(3) TFEU becomes highly relevant when companies enter into 
voluntary environmental agreements, which are restrictive of competition, 
but also carries great environmental benefits. Companies that cooperate to 
reduce their environmental pressure run the risk of violating Article 101 
TFEU. However, the case law of the EU courts, as well as the decisional 
practice of the Commission, does not fully support the Commission’s new 
approach. The Treaties demand that the Union strive towards a sustainable 
development and a high level of environmental protection. Traditionally, the 
EU courts have used a teleological interpretation method when analysing the 
provisions in the Treaties. It can be argued that the founding Treaties should 
be viewed as forming a coherent system. When the wording of Treaty 
statutes is vague enough to be open to interpretation, they should be 
interpreted as to help EU’s overarching policy objectives. Article 101 TFEU 
is open to interpretation and allows for the Treaties’ environmental goals to 
be taken into account. It can also be argued that it is economically rational 
to integrate environmental concerns into the competitive assessment. 
According to neoclassic economic theory, competition gives rise to 
“external effects” that must be internalised if society’s resources are to be 
efficiently allocated. Even if we accept the notion that only “objective 
economic benefits” may satisfy Article 101(3) TFEU, neoclassic 
environmental economic theory suggests that environmental benefits can 
constitute just that. This thesis concludes that the constitutional structure of 
the Treaties demands that environmental concerns are to be taken into 
account under Article 101 TFEU. The thesis further argues that Article 
101(1) TFEU should entail a consumer welfare test on the relevant market. 
Environmental benefits should be taken fully into account under Article 
101(3) TFEU. The aggregated positive and negative effects to society as a 
whole are considered in this assessment. Environmental benefits should be 
relevant in Article 101(3) TFEU even if they cannot be calculated into 
“objective economic benefits”.  
 2 
Sammanfattning 
EU-kommissionens tillämpning av den europeiska konkurrenslagstiftningen 
har på senare år genomgått en förändring. EU-kommissionen kräver, sedan 
konkurrenslagstiftningens modernisering 2004, att ett 
konkurrensbegränsande avtal leder till ”objektiva ekonomiska fördelar” för 
att det ska undantas enligt Artikel 101(3) FEUT. Även om EU-
kommissionen förr tog hänsyn till miljön i sin konkurrensrättsliga analys, är 
nu ekonomisk effektivitet det främsta målet för konkurrenslagstiftningen. 
Enligt nya riktlinjer utgivna av EU-kommissionen kan inte längre 
verkställande myndigheter ta hänsyn till icke-ekonomiska värden, såsom 
miljön, när de utvärderar konkurrensbegränsande avtal. Samtidigt framhåller 
sakkunniga inom miljörätten vikten av ”marknadsbaserade instrument” och 
privata initiativ för att värna om miljön. Det blir allt vanligare att företag 
själva försöker utforma sin verksamhet på ett sätt som minimerar deras 
miljöpåverkan. Inte sällan kräver detta att företagen inom en bransch 
samarbetar. Även om dessa samarbeten kan medföra stora miljömässiga 
fördelar, riskerar de att falla under förbudet i Artikel 101(1) FEUT, då de 
ofta är konkurrensbegränsande. Vilka värden som kan inkorporeras i det 
generella undantaget i Artikel 101(3) FEUT blir då högst relevant. Det 
förefaller som om EU-kommissionen inte anser att miljöfördelar kan 
rättfärdiga konkurrensbegränsande samarbeten. Detta synsätt är dock varken 
förenligt med EU-domstolarnas praxis eller EU-kommissions tidigare 
beslutspraxis. Fördragen kräver att Unionen strävar mot en hållbar 
utveckling och ett utbrett miljöskydd. Traditionellt har EU-domstolen 
använt sig av en teleologisk tolkningsmetod i förhållande till fördragen. Det 
kan argumenteras för att fördragen ska ses som en enhet; när bestämmelser i 
fördragen är öppet formulerade ska dessa tolkas så att Unionens 
övergripande mål uppnås. Det kan också argumenteras för att det är 
ekonomiskt rationellt att ta hänsyn till miljön i den konkurrensrättsliga 
analysen. Enligt nationalekonomisk teori ger konkurrens upphov till 
”externa effekter”. Dessa externa effekter måste internaliseras om samhället 
ska allokera sina resurser effektivt. Då miljön kan beräknas till ett 
instrumentellt värde, bör miljöfördelar vara relevanta i Artikel 101(3) FEUT 
även om vi accepterar att det krävs ”objektiva ekonomiska effekter”. Denna 
uppsats drar slutsatsen att fördragen kräver att miljön ska spela roll i den 
konkurrensrättsliga analysen. Författaren anser att analysen under Artikel 
101(1) FEUT ska fortsätta vara en snäv analys som enbart tar hänsyn till de 
negativa konkurrensrättsliga effekterna på den relevanta marknaden. 
Däremot bör analysen i Artikel 101(3) FEUT innefatta samtliga för- och 
nackdelar för samhället i stort. Miljöförbättringar bör tas hänsyn till oavsett 
om de kan beräknas till ”objektiva ekonomiska fördelar”.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background  
One of the greatest challenges for decisions-makers today is finding balance 
between economic expansion and environmental protection. In order to 
prevent environmental decline, policy-makers must make room for 
environmental concerns in economic assessments. While competition law is 
one of the EU’s most vital areas of economic competence, EU competition 
and environmental policies have, in recent years, controversially drifted 
apart. The European Commission has adopted an economic, consumer 
welfare-driven approach in its competition policy.1 While in the past the 
Commission may have taken environmental consideration into account in its 
competitive assessments, since the “modernisation” of European 
competition law in 2004, the Commission has stated that “objective 
economic benefits” are necessary for the exemption in Article 101(3) TFEU 
to apply.2 Consequently, as economic efficiency has become the paramount 
goal of EU competition policy it may seem like decision makers are no 
longer able to consider non-economic concerns when assessing anti-
competitive agreements.3 By adopting the consumer welfare standard, the 
Commission has declared that EU competition law shall not pursue other 
interests, such as environmental protection. However, the case law of the 
EU courts, as well as the decision practices of the Commission, do not fully 
support this new approach.4  
 
The central question is whether EU competition law should pursue one or 
several values. One view is that the sole purpose of competition policy is to 
maximize economic efficiency, which leaves no room for considering 
public policy objectives, such as environmental policy. The conflicting view 
is that competition policy is based on multiple values that cannot be reduced 
to a single economic goal.5  
 
The “modernisation” of the EU’s competition law refers to the major reform 
which took place in 2004, when Regulation 1/2003 came into force.6 
However, Jones & Sufrin describe the “modernisation” as a wider and 
deeper phenomenon.7 During the 1990s, the Commission began moving 
towards a more modern economic way of thinking in regards to competition 
law. During the modernisation process, the speeches, publications and “soft 
law” documents coming from the Commission all advocated that the EU’s 
                                                
1 Jones & Sufrin (2014) p. 35.  
2 Article 101(3) Guidelines para. 33.  
3 Kingston (2012) p. 30. 
4 Jones & Sufrin (2014) p. 41. 
5 Townley (2009) p. 1.  
6 Regulation 1/2003 
7 Jones & Sufrin (2014) p. 43.  
 5 
competition rules should promote efficiency and consumer welfare.8 The 
Commissions new approach was first expressed in its White paper on the 
modernisation of Article 101 TFEU, where it stated that Article 101(3) 
TFEU was to “provide a legal framework for the economic assessment of 
restrictive practices and not to allow the application of the competition 
rules to be set aside because of political considerations”.9 The 
Commission’s position is now articulated in the Article 101(3) Guidelines: 
“The Objective of Article 101 is to protect competition on the market as a 
means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient 
allocation of resources.”10  
 
Prima facie, it may seem like the Commission has chosen the single goal 
approach in its competition policy. According to this view, environmental 
factors have no role in Article 101 TFEU. However, as Townley points out, 
“the Commission has not sought to justify its adoption of a unitary objective 
on theoretical grounds”.11 The Article 101(3) Guidelines themselves claims 
that it outlines the current state of jurisprudence.12 This claim is surprising 
because it is generally accepted that both the EU courts and the Commission 
have taken public policy, including environmental factors, into 
consideration in the past.13  
 
The arguments rejecting environmental protection in competition policy 
stems from the highly influential Chicago School competition theory. This 
theory argues that the sole goal of antitrust policy cannot be anything else 
but consumer welfare. Competition enforcers should, by this view, only 
strive to maximize economic efficiency and consumer welfare within the 
boundaries of other legislation. It is the legislator’s job to pay attention to 
the environment, not the market actors themselves. In this sense, 
competition policy is an isolated area unaffected by society’s other 
concerns, only focusing on maximising efficiency. Proponents of this 
approach argue that isolating competition from other public interests is the 
only way to have a predictable and transparent competition law in the 
European Union.14 While the Chicago School has been highly influential in 
US antitrust-law, it is not certain that the Chicago School has influenced EU 
law in the same way. Some argue that EU law has instead been more 
influenced by ordoliberal theories, which according to them makes EU 
competition law more receptive to non-economical values.15  
 
Some scholars reject the notion that competition law assessments should be 
separated from other public policy concerns, such as environmental policy.16 
Their argument as to why the two areas of law should intertwine is often 
                                                
8 Jones & Sufrin (2014) p. 42.  
9 White Paper on the Modernisation of Article 101 TFEU, para. 57.  
10 Article 101(3) Guidelines, para. 13.  
11 Townley (2009) p. 47.  
12 Article 101(3) Guidelines, para. 7.  
13 Townley (2009) p. 47.  
14 Odudu, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2010) p. 600. 
15 Monti (2007) p. 81. 
16 For example: Kingston (2012), Monti (2007), Townley (2009), Vedder (2003) 
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derived from a teleological and systematic interpretation of the Treaties. It 
can be argued that the founding Treaties should be viewed as the foundation 
of a coherent system. When the wording of Treatises statutes is vague 
enough to be open to interpretation, they should be interpreted as to help the 
EU’s overarching policy objectives. In their view, Article 101 TFEU is open 
to interpretation and allows for the Treaties environmental goals to be taken 
into account. The Union’s goal to attain a sustainable development and a 
high level of environmental protection is referred to explicitly in Article 
3(3) TEU, Article 11 TFEU and Article 37 of the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.  
 
Another argument for why competition and environmental policy should be 
integrated takes an economic approach. Even if we accept the notion that 
only “objective economic benefits” may satisfy Article 101(3) TFEU, 
neoclassic environmental economic theory suggests that environmental 
benefits can constitute just that. This line of argument highlights how the 
environment directly affects consumer welfare.17 If environmental benefits 
constitute “objective economic benefits”, it would mean that the new 
economic approach adopted by the Commission would not necessarily 
exclude environmental factors in competitive assessments.  
 
While the Commission has chosen its single goal approach, environmental 
law academics stress the importance of market-based instruments, and the 
need for private cooperation to combat environmental decay.18 There is a 
fundamental tension between economic and environmental goals. Despite 
the wording in Article 3 TEU stating that the Union shall work towards a 
“high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment”, and numerous other pro-environmental amendments, the 
Treaties continue to prioritise economic goals.  The debate is mostly 
relevant in the assessment made under Article 101(3) TFEU. Article 101(3) 
TFEU provides an exception to the prohibition of anti-competitive 
agreements in Article 101(1) TFEU. An agreement that would otherwise be 
prohibited because if its anti-competitive elements, may be declared lawful 
if it delivers benefits to the affected consumers. The scope of Article 101(3) 
TFEU is widely considered to be unclear.19 The question is if Article 101(3) 
TFEU only applies to agreements increasing consumer welfare, or whether 
it also applies to agreements that are beneficial in a broader sense, 
contributing to public interests such as the environment. An increasing 
number of firms seek to do business in a way that minimises their 
environmental impact. Often, such initiatives require a certain degree of 
collaboration. The scope of Article 101(3) TFEU becomes highly relevant 
when companies enter into voluntary environmental agreements, which are 
restrictive of competition, but also carry great environmental benefits.     
 
 
 
                                                
17 Kingston (2012) p. 269. 
18 Vedder (2003) p. 45, Kingston (2012) p. 47.  
19 Kingston (2012) p. 261. 
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1.2 Purpose and Aim  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether EU competition law admits 
a role for environmental concerns in the competitive assessment of 
corporate agreements under Article 101 TFEU. The research questions will, 
therefore, be: 
- Are environmental concerns relevant in Article 101 TFEU? 
- If so; when are environmental concerns relevant in Article 101(1) 
TFEU? 
- And if so; when are environmental concerns relevant in Article 
101(3) TFEU?  
1.3 Method and Material  
The method I employ in this paper is a traditional legal dogmatic method. 
Basically, this means that I will analyse the posed research questions stated 
above systematically against relevant legal sources. EU law has been 
described as consisting of two levels, a community level and a national level 
composed of 28 legal systems. The empowered EU institutions draft 
legislation within its conferred competence at the community level, which 
each member state realizes within its legal system at the national level. This 
thesis will deal with EU law at community level. The relevant sources of 
law are therefore EU Treaty law, secondary law, case law and other 
instruments, such as Commission decisions, guidelines and communication, 
also called “soft law”.20    
 
This essay is structured around my posed research questions. The second 
and third research questions are dependent on the answer to the first. 
Consequently, I will start by analysing my first research question from two 
different perspectives. Traditionally the EU Courts have used a teleological 
interpretation method when analysing the provisions in the EU Treaties.21 
Through this method, the EU Courts have attempted to interpret the 
provisions in order to achieve the Union goals set out in Article 3 TEU. I 
will first use a teleological approach towards the Treaties when analysing 
my first research question. Secondary, I intend to use an economic 
perspective. Environmental economics is a complex field of research and I 
do not claim that I will give the reader a comprehensive presentation of 
economic theory. My aim is to apply some basic environmental economic 
theories in order to give a suggestion as to how to consolidate 
environmental benefits with the concepts of “consumer welfare” and 
“objective economic benefits”. After I have dealt with my primary research 
question I will address my second and third research question by 
investigating EU Treaty law, case law and soft law in order to discern when 
environmental policy has been relevant in Article 101 TFEU in the past.  
 
                                                
20 Reicher (2013) p. 110. 
21 Reicher (2013) p. 122. 
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The debate whether public policy has a role in European competition law 
has been on-going the last 20 years, and was intensified after 2004 in 
connection with the modernisation of the EU competition law. Prominent 
figures in the debate are Dr. Suzanne Kingston at University College Dublin 
and Dr. Christopher Townley at Kings College London, both of whom 
maintain that environmental concerns should be considered in the 
assessment under Article 101 TFEU. Contrarily, Dr. Okeoghene Odudu at 
the University of Cambridge argues an isolation principle, and maintains 
that EU competition law should have one single goal, namely consumer 
welfare. Many other academics have contributed to the debate, among them 
Prof. Richard Whish, David Bailey, Prof. Alison Jones and Prof. Brenda 
Sufrin, Prof. Giorgio Monti and Prof. Hans Vedder. It might seem like the 
Commission in recent years has adopted the isolation principle through its 
Article 101(3) Guidelines, and thereby put an end to the debate. However, 
while having a strong normative effect on decision-makers in the 
Community, this document has no actual legal effect.22 In the absence of 
firm jurisprudence, it is still up for debate whether environmental policy is 
relevant in EU competition law.  
1.4 Limitations 
This thesis deals exclusively with EU law at the Community level, which 
means I will not cover any Swedish national legislation. However, 
conclusions made about substantive EU competition law in this paper are 
applicable to Swedish national competition law. Article 101 TFEU is 
directly applicable to agreements that affect trade between member states. 
Furthermore, the Swedish legislator has the ambition to apply Swedish 
substantive competition law consistently with EU competition law, 
regardless of whether the matter in question exclusively affects the Swedish 
market.23  
 
Except for some short comments referring to the US anti-trust system, the 
reader will not be given a comparative perspective on other judicial systems. 
Instead, I focus on presenting a comprehensive exposition of EU 
competition law.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis deals exclusively with Article 101 TFEU. 
Competition law is a broad area of law, and the integration of environmental 
concerns into competition policy is also relevant in relation to public 
procurement and abuse of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. 
However, due to the limited scope of a thesis, I found that Article 101 
TFEU could be analysed in a concise and comprehensive manner.  
 
Finally, I will focus exclusively on the relation between competition law 
and environmental policy. Even if some arguments in this thesis may be 
transmitted to the wider debate concerning other public policy objectives in 
                                                
22 Reicher (2013) p. 127. 
23 Proposition 2007/08:135 p. 70. 
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relation to competition law, I believe one should be cautious when 
integrating competition law with other fields of interest. It is important to 
look at each public policy area in order to establish if it can be relevant in 
the competitive assessment.  
 
1.5 Disposition  
This paper is divided into six chapters. The second chapter will examine two 
diverse subjects. First, the theoretical background of EU competition law. 
This will be followed by a brief summary of the development of EU 
environmental policy and its regulatory mix. This background will provide a 
foundation to both the teleological and economic arguments presented in 
chapter three.  
 
Chapter three will address my first research question: “Are environmental 
concerns relevant in Article 101 TFEU?”. The question will be addressed 
using two different perspectives separated in two subchapters. First, Article 
101 TFEU will be investigated in its Treaty context. A teleological and 
systematic interpretation of the Treaties will be performed in order to 
establish if the goal of environmental protection is relevant under Article 
101 TFEU. Secondly, I will use neoclassic economic theory in order to 
establish the relation between consumer welfare and the environment. 
 
The fourth chapter will address my second research question: “When are 
environmental concerns relevant in Article 101(1) TFEU?”. This chapter 
will investigate the concept of “restriction of competition”. Furthermore, it 
will take a closer look on how environmental agreements have been 
assessed under Article 101(1) TFEU in the past. Lastly, the chapter will deal 
with the “ancillary restraint doctrine”. 
 
The fifth chapter will address my third research question: “When are 
environmental concerns relevant in Article 101(3) TFEU?”. The chapter 
will first look at how public policy objectives have been assessed under 
Article 101(3) TFEU in the past. Thereafter, each of the four cumulative 
conditions under Article 101(3) TFEU will be interpreted in relation to 
environmental agreements. 
 
The sixth and final chapter will provide a conclusive analysis including the 
authors’ own opinion about the relation between competition and 
environmental policy.  
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2 Background  
“Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a firm 
answer to one question: What is the point of the law – what are its goals? 
Everything else follows from the answer we give. Is the antitrust judge to be 
guided by one value or by several? If by several, how is he to decide cases 
where a conflict in value arises? Only when the issue of goals has been 
settled is it possible to frame a coherent body of substantive rules”.24 
 
R. Bork “The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself” 1993 
 
2.1 Competition law theories 
The question whether environmental protection has a role in EU 
competition law is largely dependent on which competition theory 
perspective we choose to adopt: that will ultimately decide what we 
perceive to be the objective of EU competition law. Competition law is an 
intricate subject where law, economics and politics are interrelated. 
Fundamentally, competition regulation exists in order to achieve a desired 
socio-economic outcome.25  
 
A common concern of all free-market competition theories is that firms with 
excessive market power are able to harm consumer welfare, for example, by 
reducing output, raising prices, suppressing innovation, and hindering new 
entrants to the market.26 Instead, it is desired that market actors struggle on 
equal terms for superiority and for obtaining the markets customers. The 
competition between market actors creates incentives to always be better by 
lowering prices, enhancing quality, and increasing the product availability. 
Competition is a dynamic process where the firm will be forced to 
outperform its competitors. This process will ultimately increase the overall 
welfare of the society.27 Under these circumstances, the price mechanism 
will level output to match demand, so that allocation of resources is 
maximised.28 Rivalry is consequently the essential means through which 
desirable societal goals can be obtained.  
 
Up to this point, the different competition theories agree with each other. 
However, the theories disagree on how and to what extent competition law 
should be applied to maximise societal welfare. The central question is 
whether competition law should be guided by one or several goals. We will 
now look at three different theories of competition: Ordoliberalism, the 
Harvard School, and the Chicago School.   
                                                
24 Bork (1993) p. 50.  
25 Monti (2007) p. 54.  
26 Whish & Bailey (2012) p. 2.  
27 Vedder (2003) p. 25. 
28 Kolstad (2000) p. 85. 
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2.1.1 Ordoliberalism  
Ordoliberalism is not only relevant for competition law, but also, an all-
encompassing political and economic philosophy.29 With origins in 1930s 
Germany, the theory is rooted in liberalism. Just like classical liberals, the 
ordoliberals hold that in order to achieve economic prosperity and economic 
freedom, it is essential to develop an economic system that supports 
competition. However, the theory does not share the liberals’ view that the 
state should play a minimal role. Instead, they advocate a competitive 
market within a constitutional framework, which may further a just 
distribution of resources in society. This framework serves mainly to 
counter excessive concentration of public and private power. In this system, 
the state’s role is to continuously adapt and safeguard the economic 
constitution.30    
 
Competition policy is fundamental to the ordoliberal theory. The essential 
aim is to repress harmful concentration of economic power in the free 
market, which means that anti-monopoly law is central to ordoliberal 
competition policy. Monopolies are repressed in order to achieve 
“performance competition” which entails competition that provides better 
products and services for consumers. The ordoliberals do not believe in a 
strict separation between economic efficiency and other society goals. They 
view economy and competition as tools to integrate society around 
democratic and humane principles, meaning that competition is merely a 
means to pursue non-economic values. Consequently, the ordoliberal 
viewpoint is that an “integrated policy perspective” must be adopted where 
each decision is taken with a holistic approach to the community’s legal, 
political and economic systems. An economic system, where policy areas 
are divided, ignores the interaction between policy areas. Orloliberal 
competition theory argues that competition law, if it stands separated from 
other concerns, has little or no value to the Community as a whole.31 
2.1.2 The Harvard School  
The Harvard School competition theory was developed in the 1940s and 
focused on market structure and its behaviour.32 Certain market structures 
were, according to this theory, the cause of anticompetitive conduct. 
Competition regulation should consequently be devised to prevent such 
market failures.33 The highest-ranking goal of this theory was to optimise 
the societal welfare as a whole. Much like the ordoliberal ideas, anti-trust 
policy was an integrated part of a broad economic policy strategy according 
to the Harvard School. Consequently, the anti-trust policy was viewed as an 
                                                
29 Jones & Sufrin (2014) p. 33. 
30 Kingston (2012) p. 12. 
31 Bastidas (2011) p. 49.  
32 Also know as ”The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm”, see Monti (2007) p. 57.  
33 Monti (2007) p. 62. 
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instrument to attain multiple societal goals.34 Advocates of the theory 
argued that non-economic goals, such as fairness in society, were included 
as legitimate goals of competition policy. The theory was concerned with 
preserving the optimum market order. If conditions of the relevant market 
were departing from the optimum order, the state had to interfere. These 
departures could be the existence of monopolies or entry barriers to the 
market. These market failures could also constitute misuse of resources that 
gave rise to external effects, such as environmental damage. To cure these 
deficits, state intervention in the market was necessary. This could be done 
through competition policy. The Harvard school was highly influential in 
the US during the 1950s and 1960s, but lost much of it popularity with the 
introduction of the Chicago School.35  
2.1.3 The Chicago School  
The Chicago School revolutionised competition law in the 1970s by 
rejecting much of the accepted competition theories at the time in the US. 
The Chicago School saw neoclassic microeconomics, in particular price 
theory and the presumption of profit maximisation, as the essence of 
antitrust policy.36 The fundamental difference between the Chicago School 
theory, compared to the Harvard School theory and Ordoliberalism, was the 
belief that market forces alone would result in maximising societal welfare. 
The state was to exercise little or no influence on the market.37 The market 
was “self-healing” and inefficient entities would be exterminated through 
the survival of the fittest. The sole goal of competition law should be the 
pursuit of economic efficiency.38 Economic efficiency was a mean of 
obtaining consumer welfare.39 The Chicago School was closely associated 
with Robert Bork. His view of the single goal principle can be summarised 
by the following lines: 
 
“No body of law can protect everything that people value. If antitrust could, 
we would need no other statues. If we trace the implications of the 
proposition, it results in judges deciding cases as if the Sherman Act said: 
‘A restraint of trade shall consist of any contract, combination, or 
conspiracy that fails to produce, in the eyes of the court, the optimum mix of 
consumer welfare and other good things that Americans want’. That is 
inevitably the result of bringing into judicial consideration an open-ended 
list of attractive-sounding goals to be weighed against consumer welfare.”40 
 
The Chicago School’s single goal approach to competition policy leaves no 
room to pursue non-economical considerations such as environmental 
concerns. Competition policy should, according to the theory, be free from 
                                                
34 Vedder (2003) p. 30.  
35 Bastidas (2011) p. 55.  
36 Kingston (2012) p. 23. 
37 Vedder (2003) p. 35.  
38 Jones & Sufrin (2014) p. 23.  
39 Odudu, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2010) p. 601.  
40 Bork (1993) p. 74. 
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political consideration, which would only render it inefficient. It was argued 
that a unitary goal enhances legal certainty and justiciability.41 Furthermore, 
restricting competition to achieve short-term political objectives would 
deteriorate the welfare of society due to increased uncertainty in the market 
in the long run. According to the theory, courts and government agencies 
were not suited for taking public policy into consideration. This task was to 
be left for the legislator.42 Leaving public policy decisions for the legislator 
would provide integrity to the legislative process and enhance predictability 
in the courts while avoiding arbitrary rulings. Redistribution of wealth was 
not a task for competition law, but instead done by the legislator and the 
government through taxation.43  
2.1.4 Conclusion 
A clear line can be drawn between Ordoliberalism and the Harvard School 
theory and, on the other hand, the Chicago School. All three theories’ 
ultimate goal is to maximise societal welfare. However, the Chicago School 
believes that the societal welfare is maximised through isolating competition 
law from other policies by allowing competition policy to strive towards one 
single goal, namely efficiency. Contrarily, both Ordoliberalim and the 
Harvard School see competition as a means to achieve multiple societal 
goals. 
 
The question is which of these theories has had the biggest influence on EU 
competition law. The ordoliberal theory was highly influential on the early 
Community’s economic policy and its competition law.44 The Chicago 
School quickly became dominant in the US, although its influence in the EU 
was less evident. Monti maintains that the early ordoliberal influences kept 
the Chicago theory from being fully accepted in Europe. European 
competition law has until now favoured economic freedom, market 
integration and other treaty goals above pure economic efficiency.45  
 
It might seem like in recent years the Chicago School has taken hold of EU 
competition law. EU competition policy, led by Directorate General 
Competition, is increasingly reliant on economic reasoning. The 
modernisation reform in 2004 has introduced an efficiency-based approach, 
i.e. the single goal policy of the Chicago School. However, Kingston argues 
that this new approach in no way suggests that the Commission has fully 
adopted the Chicago School theory. It is uncertain if the US antitrust policy, 
with its focus on a single efficiency goal, can be transferred into a EU 
context. As mentioned earlier, our competition policy will ultimately be 
decided by how we perceive our economy should be structured. In Article 
3(3) TEU, the Union states its vision of obtaining a sustainable social 
market economy with a high level of environmental protection, a 
                                                
41 Odudu (2006) p. 159.  
42 Jones & Sufrin (2014) p. 27. 
43 Kingston (2012) p. 27. 
44 Bastidas (2011) p. 46.  
45 Monti, Common Market Law Review (2002) p. 1060. 
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fundamental constitutional difference between the US and the EU 
competition law systems. EU competition policy rests on a different 
constitutional and legal framework to that of the US.46  
 
In sum, the development towards an economic approach in EU competition 
law does not imply that EU competition enforcers have selected a particular 
model of competition theory. EU competition policy displays a mixture of 
attributes from different theoretical models. Even though economic welfare 
and efficiency constitute important goals in the EU competition policy, there 
is little evidence that these goals are exclusive.  
2.2 EU Environmental policy  
2.2.1 The development of EU environmental 
policy 
Environmental policy was, unlike competition policy, not included in the 
original Treaty of Rome. When the Treaty was signed in 1957, the original 
goals of the Community were to achieve a lasting peace and to establish an 
integrated European market. At the time, the field of environmental law was 
a relatively new notion to the original member states. However, during the 
later half of the 20th-century, environmental policy developed into one of 
EU’s most important areas of law.47   
 
The starting point for the EU environmental policy was the 1972 Paris 
Summit of the European Council, where it was declared that a focus solely 
on economic growth was unwise. It was said, “[e]conomic expansion is not 
an end in itself. Its first aim should be to enable disparities in living 
conditions to be reduced. […] It should result in an improvement in the 
quality of life as well as in standards of living. As befits the genius of 
Europe, particular attention will be given to intangible values and to 
protecting the environment, so that progress may really be put at the service 
of mankind”.48 Environmental protection was made an explicit goal of the 
Community in 1986 by inserting Article 25 of the Single European Act.49 
Although the environment was an ancillary policy to the Communities’ 
primary goals of achieving an internal market, it nevertheless provided a 
legal basis for environmental legislation. Environmental concern was given 
a higher priority in the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 
1993.50 The insertion of a reference to environmental protection in Article 2 
EC, which said that “to promote throughout the Community a harmonious 
and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-
inflationary growth respecting the environment” was of major importance. 
Consequently, sustainable development and environmental concern were, 
                                                
46 Kingston (2012) p. 40. 
47 Ibid., p. 98.  
48 Bulletin of the European Communities. "Statement from the Paris Summit" (1972) p. 2 
49 SEA. 
50 Treaty of Maastricht.  
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for the first time, made fundamental goals of the Community.51 The Treaty 
of Amsterdam, which was adopted in 1999, furthered the importance of the 
Community’s environmental goals, thanks in a major part to the then newest 
member states of Sweden, Finland and Austria.52 Article 2 EC stated that a 
“high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment” 
was a Community objective. Furthermore, the integration principle was 
introduced which required environmental protection to be integrated into the 
definitions and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities.53 
 
In 2001, the Council added sustainable development as a third goal to the 
Lisbon Strategy, stating “[s]ustainable development – to meet the needs of 
the present generation without compromising those of future generations – 
is a fundamental objective under the Treaties. That requires dealing with 
economic, social and environmental policies in a mutually reinforcing 
way.” 54 The Treaty of Lisbon was enacted in 2009 which made The Treaty 
of the European Union (TEU) and The Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) the constitutional basis of the European Union.55 
The Union’s values and objectives have its constitutional base in TEU. 
Article 3(3) TEU states both the Union’s competitive and environmental 
objectives: 
 
The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth 
and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at 
full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific 
and technological advance. 
 
The integration of environmental concerns into the Union’s policy is 
required by the so-called “integration principle” in Article 11 TFEU and 
reads:  
 
Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of the Union's policies and activities, in 
particular with a view to promoting sustainable development. 
 
This so-called “policy-linking” clause should be read in connection with 
Article 7 TFEU, which ensures harmony between the Union’s policies and 
activities:  
 
The Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, 
taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the principle 
of conferral of power.  
 
                                                
51 Kingston, European Law Journal (2010) p. 785.  
52 Treaty of Amsterdam.  
53 Kingston (2012) p. 100. 
54 Presidency Conclusions of the Goteborg European Council, 2001, para. 19 
55 Jones & Sufrin (2014) p. 100. 
 16 
A similar provision like the one in Article 11 TFEU, is found in Article 37 
of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights56 with the heading 
“Environmental protection”: 
 
A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality 
of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and 
ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development. 
 
Lastly, Article 191 TFEU states a number of goals for the Union in relation 
to environmental protection. Union policy shall contribute to preserving the 
quality of the environment, protecting human health, promoting rational 
utilisation of natural resources and promote measures at the international 
level to deal with regional and worldwide environmental problems. 
 
2.2.2 The shift towards market-based 
instruments 
As we saw in the previous section, environmental protection is an important 
Union law principle. One of the most prominent developments in EU 
environmental policy has been the increased use of market-based 
instruments, which utilize the market mechanisms to obtain environmental 
goals. Even though state regulations and prohibitions still constitute the 
principal driving force in EU environmental policy, private initiatives are 
being recognised as vital for preserving the environment. This gradual shift 
from regulatory to market-based instruments has had consequences for the 
relationship between EU environmental and competition policy, bringing 
environmental policy within the scope of Article 101 TFEU.57     
 
Direct regulation remains the principal means to enforce EU environmental 
policy. A typical example of direct regulation is a regulation setting a limit 
on the amount of pollution emissions by companies each year. Direct 
regulation is suitable for certain areas of environmental protection, 
especially setting emission limits for a particular installation or an industry. 
State regulation is also necessary for protecting certain precious natural 
resources, such as preserving biodiversity or endangered species.58   
 
Direct regulation carries advantages in the form of legal certainty and 
transparency.59 However, there are several disadvantages with direct 
regulation. Legislative procedure is slow and often has problems keeping up 
with technical innovation in the industry and state authorities tend to be 
uninformed and lack up-to-date information as to which standards are 
suitable. This often leads to either over- or under-regulation. The state may 
counter this problem by frequently updating environmental standards, but 
                                                
56 Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
57 Vedder, 2003 p. 45.  
58 Ibid., p. 46. 
59 Kingston (2012) p. 45.  
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then the advantage of legal certainty is lost. Also, information gathering and 
enforcement are costly, which makes direct regulation an expensive 
instrument. Lastly, direct regulation is considered hampering to the market 
actors’ initiative to innovate. It is believed that a market actor who meets the 
allowed level of pollution will not invest in pollution abatement 
technologies if this would mean going beyond the state-set standard.60  
 
The use of market-based instruments slowly began in the 1990s. The 
fundamental feature of these instruments is they use the market mechanism 
to provide incentives to guide behaviour towards a desired environmental 
outcome.61 Market-based instruments include environmental taxation, 
tradable emission permits, and private environmental agreements. 
Neoclassic economic theory identifies the existence of externalities and 
market failures as the cause of environmental degradation.62 Externalities 
exist because the polluter only bears a small part of the cost of pollution. 
Unchecked, the market mechanism will result in excessive pollution because 
no market actor is required to pay for the cost to society. Market-based 
instruments try to internalise these external costs more adequately, 
consequently putting a price on pollution. This is in accordance with the so-
called “polluter pays principle”, which is the favoured EU environmental 
policy.63 Market-based instruments provide an economically efficient way 
to achieve environmental goals by generating incentive for the market actors 
to go beyond what has been prescribed by the state.64 A firm who can 
reduce pollution more cheaply than its competitors will have an incentive to 
do so. Market-based instruments are self-regulating and consequently 
cheaper for the society than direct regulation.  
 
One type of market-based instrument is voluntary environmental 
agreements. Such agreements can be seen as a part of the Corporate Social 
Responsibility phenomenon.65 Many states promote corporate social 
responsibility, which entails companies and individuals taking initiative on a 
voluntary basis to integrate social and environmental concerns in their 
business operations. Many companies seek to do business in a way that 
minimises their environmental impact. Sometimes these initiatives require a 
certain degree of collaboration. Voluntary environmental agreements may 
include agreements between market actors to reduce pollution, eco-labelling 
or setting environmental industrial standards. Proponents of these types of 
agreements contend that they can reach parts of the economy that direct 
regulation fails to reach. They are highly flexible and quick to implement. 
The Commission has recognised the importance of voluntary environmental 
agreements, and has acknowledged that non-regulatory measures are more 
appropriate and flexible for addressing environmental issues in some 
                                                
60 Vedder, 2003 p. 47.  
61 Ibid., p. 47.  
62 Tietenberg & Lewis (2012) p. 25. The economic theory behind externalities will be 
explained further in Chapter 3.2. 
63 XXVth Report on Competition Policy 1995, para. 84.  
64 Kingston, 2012 p. 51.  
65 Ibid., pp. 76 – 78.  
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cases.66 Furthermore, the Commission has stated that private co-operation 
agreements have several advantages over state intervention. Private 
agreements promote a pro-active attitude in the industry. They are 
considered more cost efficient and can provide tailor made solutions for the 
industry at hand.67  
 
Market-based instruments also have shortcomings. The prince-mechanism 
may fail in an artificial market and polluting can become “cheap”. Self-
regulation might also facilitate collusion in the relevant market. 
Consequently, market-based instruments must always be used in 
combination with direct regulation.68 Nevertheless, Vedder holds that the 
only way to truly internalise all environmental costs is by allowing 
producers to enter into environmental agreements. Such agreements are 
likely to be restrictive of competition, because competition inherently 
involves a degree of wastefulness due to externalities.69  
 
2.2.3 Conclusion 
As we saw in section 2.2.1, environmental policy during the later part of the 
20th century has grown into one of the Union’s most prominent areas of law. 
The goal of sustainable development and environmental protection is 
explicitly stated in Article 3(3) TEU, Article 11 TFEU and Article 37 of the 
EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. Sustainable development has since 
2001 been one of the three Lisbon Strategy goals, the other two being 
economic and social goals. However, the integration of sustainable 
development issues into EU policy areas has been “painfully slow” 
according to Kingston. Kingston maintains that of the three goals that are 
inherent in “sustainable development”, i.e. economic, social and 
environmental, the environmental goal has been left behind. Sustainable 
development has become “a green catchword in policy documents and in 
the preamble to legislation, it rarely has a noticeable effect on the 
substantive rules or standards ultimately adopted”.70 Nevertheless, the 
Treaty obligates decision-makers to integrate environmental concerns in 
other areas of Union policy. 
 
A significant development in EU environmental policy has been the shift 
from the exclusive use of direct state regulation to a regulatory mix where 
market-based instruments have an important role. Direct regulation has been 
found inflexible and has had problems to meet the requirements of 
industries. It is dependent on the efficiency and flexibility of the state, two 
                                                
66 COM(2001) 31 Environment 2010: Our future, Our choice, para 2.3. See also: 
COM(2002) 412 Environmental Agreements at Community Level Within the Framework 
of the Action Plan on the Simplification and Improvement of the Regulatory Environment, 
p. 5. 
67 Commission Green Paper, Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, paras. 42 – 60.  
68 Vedder, 2003 p. 48.  
69 Ibid., p. 55.  
70 Kingston (2012) p. 105.  
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traits seldom attributed to the EU. The state also lacks resources to achieve 
full enforcement of every industry. Therefore, direct regulation has been 
described as giving a false sense of security. State control is necessary and 
in certain environmental areas essential, but nevertheless has limits and 
cannot be the sole instrument for achieving sustainable development.71   
 
Market-based instruments have been found as necessary compliments to 
direct regulation. It can be argued that the only way to obtain sustainable 
development is to make environmental protection an integrated part of 
market actors’ everyday economic assessment, while giving them some 
freedom on how to approach the environmental problem. Direct regulation 
will always be an external factor forced upon the parties that only has to be 
respected. This integration might be accomplished by letting market actors 
co-operate to achieve environmental objectives.72 However, these private 
initiatives may conflict with EU competition law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
71 Kingston (2012) p. 49. 
72 Vedder (2003) p. 48.  
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3 Are environmental concerns 
relevant in Article 101 TFEU? 
3.1 Systematic and Teleological 
Argumentation  
This line of argument, held by Kingston and Townley among others, is 
grounded in the system of the Treaty and its underlying principles.73 
Basically, the argument is that the founding Treaties should form a coherent 
system. Townley considers that it is not enough to perform a mere textual 
analysis of Article 101 TFEU in order to clarify whether environmental 
concerns are relevant to the provision.74 In hard cases where two Treaty 
goals conflict, such as environment and competition, the EU Courts adopt a 
holistic view of the Treaties structure and objectives. The Courts then use a 
methodology based on systematic and teleological arguments, rather than 
semiotic/linguistic, to solve these types of conflicts.75 Kingston argues 
“where possible, and where Treaty provisions are sufficiently open-textured 
to be open to interpretation, they should be interpreted so as to help, and 
not hinder, the EU’s other policy objectives”.76 Jones & Sufrin also 
maintain that EU competition rules must be viewed in the context of the 
aims and objectives of the EU.77 Because environmental protection and 
sustainable development are two Treaty objectives, the provisions regulating 
competition in the Treaty should help in achieving these goals.  
 
Townley states that the Treaties generate conflicts by setting different goals 
for the Union without an apparent hierarchy, and through the inclusion of 
policy-linking clauses.78 Unlike US anti-trust law, EU competition law is 
not a “stand-alone” competition legislation aimed at isolated goals. Rather, 
the EU’s competition law is part of a web of inter-related articles that form 
the Treaties. Consequently, it is important to investigate which other goals 
might be relevant to the competition articles, by putting Article 101 TFEU 
in its Union law context. The Union has pursued a multitude of objectives 
which go far beyond that of undistorted competition ever since the 
Maastricht Treaty.79 The ultimate aims of the Union are outlined in Article 3 
TEU. As we saw in chapter 2.2.1, Article 3.3 TEU states that the Union 
shall work for “the sustainable development of Europe” based on a “highly 
competitive social market economy” while having a “high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment”. 
                                                
73 Kingston (2012) p. 97. 
74 Townley (2009) p. 48.  
75 See for example: Case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministereo della Sanità [1982] ECR 03415 para. 
20.  
76 Kingston (2012) p. 97.  
77 Jones & Sufrin (2014) p. 18.  
78 Townley (2009) p. 48.  
79 Casey, European Law Journal (2009) p. 362.  
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Article 3 TEU does not disclose any hierarchy between the different aims. 
The lack of hierarchy between the Union’s objectives creates a problem 
because the different goals may conflict with each other. This is the case 
where in pursuing a sustainable development, a high level of environmental 
protection and a highly competitive market are often incompatible. 
Implementing provisions such as Article 101 TFEU in turn must 
consequently deal with these conflicting aims. In TeliaSonera the Court of 
Justice stated that the function of EU’s competition rules is “precisely to 
prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public 
interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the well-
being of the European Union”.80 Jones & Sufrin hold that the phrase “well-
being of the Union” is a clear reference to the goals set out in Article 3 
TEU.81    
 
Conflicts also arise due to the Treaties policy-linking clauses. Article 11 
TFEU, as noted in chapter 2.2.1, contains the integration principle, which 
obligates EU policymakers to integrate environmental protection 
requirements into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies 
and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable 
development. Competition is a Union policy, meaning that environmental 
consideration must be taken when competition policy is implemented. This 
article should be read in connection with the general policy-linking clause, 
Article 7 TFEU, which ensures consistency between policies and 
activities.82 In contrast to the other provisions in the Treaty that promote 
sustainable development, Article 11 TFEU poses a concrete obligation for 
all EU decision-makers to integrate environmental protection 
requirements.83 This has been acknowledged by the Court of Justice in 
PreussenElektra, concerning the free movement rules in Article 34 TFEU. 
In this case, the court held that due to the integration principle, 
“environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of other Community policies”. The court 
stated that protecting the environment was a “priority objective” for the 
Community, and accordingly, a requirement to purchase renewable energy 
was not considered a restrictive measure incompatible with Article 34 
TFEU.84 
 
The Treaties’ implementing provisions, such as Article 101 TFEU, deal 
with conflicting objectives in two principal ways.85 First, the Treaties allow 
for some values to exclude others. This is the case in Article 346 TFEU 
where no provisions in the Treaty, including competition policy, shall 
preclude any Member State from taking necessary measures for the 
                                                
80 Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-00527 para. 
22. The case considered if TeliaSonera’s pricing policy constituted an abuse of dominant 
position under Article 102 TFEU. 
81 Jones & Sufrin (2014) p. 48.  
82 Kingston (2012) p. 106. 
83 Vedder (2003) p. 68. 
84 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra v. Schleswag AG [2001] ECR I-02099 paras. 73 – 81. 
85 Townley (2009) p. 52.  
 22 
protection of essential interests of security related to war material. However, 
this is an extreme way of settling conflicts. In the past, the EU courts have 
been reluctant to use exclusion insofar as Article 101 TFEU is concerned.86 
Typically, the Treaties find a compromise between the conflicting 
objectives. This has been the case concerning Article 34 TFEU, where the 
provision of free movement of goods has been balanced against public 
policy concerns set out in Article 36 TFEU. Environmental protection has 
been recognised by the EU courts as an acceptable justification to restrict 
free movement.87 Kingston maintains that the EU competition rules should 
be interpreted consistently with the EU internal market rules, allowing a 
compromise with environmental concerns within Article 101 TFEU. As 
mentioned above, the policy-linking environmental clause in Article 11 
TFEU demands that environmental concerns should be taken into account in 
both the “implementation and the definition of other policies” which should 
further imply compromise in cases of conflict.  
 
Article 101(3) TFEU is written in a way that makes balancing different 
values possible, but its text does not allow for all Treaty objectives to be 
taken into account. Which values may be taken into consideration is open 
for debate, but we have seen that the policy-linking clauses, such as Article 
11 TFEU, entail an express balancing imperative. Kingston argues that 
Article 11 TFEU, in combination with the goals set out in Article 3 TEU, 
obligates policy-makers to apply environmental protection requirements at 
all times in priority to all other potentially conflicting objectives.88 She 
points out that this approach is the only viable option given that the majority 
of scientific research finds environmental disaster is imminent if a “business 
as usual” approach is taken by governments in relation to the 
environment.89  
 
In cases of irresolvable conflict between two Treaty goals, such as the goals 
of competition and protection of the environment, Kingston suggests falling 
back on the principle of proportionality. This formula has often been used 
by the Courts in situations where it has been questioned whether measures 
taken by EU institutions are compatible with general principles of EU law.90 
The formula has three parts: a measure is proportionate when (1) the 
measure is suitable to achieve a legitimate aim under the Treaty, (2) the 
measure is the least restrictive of the conflicting EU goals as is possible, and 
(3) the measure does not have an excessive effect on other interests.91 The 
result would, according to Kingston, be that “where a measure (private or 
                                                
86 Townley (2009) p. 62.  
87 Case C-297/05 Commission v Netherlands [2007] ECR I-07467 para. 77. The case dealt 
with a requirement, posed on foreign cars, to preform a roadworthiness test before 
registration in the Netherlands. It was questioned if this requirement violated the free 
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88 Kingston (2012) p. 115.  
89 Kingston, European Law Journal (2010) p. 789.  
90 See for example: 154 & 155/04 Alliance for Natural Health [2005] ECR I-06451 para. 
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state) is suitable to achieve the EU’s environmental policy objectives, and 
there is no way of achieving these objectives that is less restrictive of 
competition, the measure should be allowed under EU competition law” .92 
 
The EU Courts have a long tradition of balancing public policy goals within 
Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 101(3) TFEU, using the principle of 
proportionality.93 In both Wouters and in Meca-Medina, the EU Court of 
Justice balanced public policy concerns against the restrictions of 
competition under Article 101(1) TFEU, concluding that the former 
outweighed the latter, finding, there was no infringement of Article 101(1) 
TFEU.94 Furthermore, the EU Courts have used the first condition of Article 
101(3) TFEU to balance different public policy aims, for example in Metro 
I, Matra, and Métropole Télévision.95 The text of the article has been 
interpreted expansively, where “improving technical progress” has been 
interpreted to include agreements improving our ability to protect the 
environment.  
 
The conflicting view is that Article 101 TFEU should be applied in 
isolation, solely for the purpose of creating a system to ensure competition 
is not distorted, leaving the rest of the Treaty to deal with the other aims of 
the Union. Environmental concerns would therefore be dealt with by other 
provisions and policies, in line with the Chicago School theory. However, 
Townley rejects this argument on several grounds.96 No other Treaty 
provisions are read in isolation, which would run contrary to the Treaties’ 
ordoliberal traditions. If the Treaties were interpreted in this way, then all 
aims in Article 3 TEU would have their own implementation articles, such 
as Article 101 TFEU for competition policy. This is, however, not the case. 
Furthermore, the EU Court of Justice held in Continental Can that Article 
101 TFEU aims to bring about several of Article 3 TEU’s objectives.97 
 
Odudu submits three principal objections against the systematic/teleological 
argumentation. First, he questions if the policy-linking clauses in the Treaty 
can create rights and obligations for subjects of European law.98 The only 
way of derogating from a Union objective is if the policy-linking clauses 
can create a positive obligation to pursue other goals. In order to create 
rights and obligations on private subjects the policy-linking clauses must 
have horizontal direct effect. Odudu maintains that nothing suggests that 
                                                
92 Kingston (2012) p. 115.  
93 Townley (2009) p. 65.  
94 Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991 and Case 
C-309/99 Wouters and others v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten 
[2002] ECR I-1577.  
95 Case 26/76 Metro SB-Grobmärke GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1977] ECR 1875, 
Case T-17/93 Matra Hachette SA v Commission [1994] ECR II-595, and Joined cases T-
528, 542, 543 & 546/93 Métropole Télévision and others v Commission [1996] ECR II-
649. 
96 Townley (2009) p. 51.  
97 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v 
Commission [1973] ECR-215 paras. 22 – 25. The concerned Continental Can’s dominant 
position in Europe and if the company possibly violated Article 102 TFEU   
98 Odudu, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2010) p. 606. 
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this is the case. Consequently, the policy-linking clauses can only pose 
obligations on Member States.99 Policy-linking clauses require public policy 
to be considered when the Union legislates, rather than when Union 
legislation is enforced.  
 
Secondly, Odudu questions whether taking public policy concerns into 
account under Article 101 TFEU, such as environmental sustainability, is 
legitimate.100 He writes that “[i]f such non-efficiency objectives are 
important to Union citizens one would expect them to be pursued through 
democratic, political, legislative routes”. Odudu highlights the point that 
the Union is an entity with limited competence, as a result of the principle of 
conferral. Implementing environmental concerns through Article 101 TFEU 
would mean that EU competition law becomes hijacked in order to obtain 
wider goals. Efficiency is the only policy protected by competition law, 
achieved by a legitimate and democratic process.  
 
Lastly, balancing public policy goals such as the environment within Article 
101 TFEU, requires reading into Article 101 TFEU beyond its wording. He 
writes that “the circumstances in which Article [101] can be sacrificed for 
some other socially desirable goal must be expressly stated and clearly 
specified”.101 The uniformity of Community law, Odudu says, will not 
survive the unilateral determination that certain goals trump Article 101 
TFEU.   
 
An interesting question is if Article 11 TFEU provides the possibility of 
using Article 101 TFEU to prohibit environmentally disastrous agreements 
even though the agreements are not restrictive of competition. Article 101 
TFEU has been used in this way in relation to market integration. The 
Commission has condemned agreements as restrictive of competition even 
when they did not lead to inefficiencies and higher prices (see Chapter 4.1 
for a definition of “restriction of competition”), only because the agreement 
conflicted with the Treaty goal of market integration.102 However, both 
Kingston and Townley note that the policy-makers’ power is limited to the 
wording of the Treaties, which is a result of the conferral of power principle. 
The Treaties do not permit policy-makers to choose a greener option outside 
their policy area. An agreement between market actors that has disastrous 
consequences for the environment, but nonetheless do not affect 
competition, cannot be prohibited by Article 101 TFEU. It goes beyond the 
scope of the article, and would constitute a miss-use of power.103  
                                                
99 Odudu (2006) p. 167.  
100 Odudu, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2010) p. 608. 
101 Odudu (2006) p. 169.  
102 Townley (2013) p. 37. See also joined cases C-468/06 etc. Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE and 
Others v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proïonton [2008] ECR I-07139 para. 65. 
The case dealt with if a refusal by GlaxosmithKline, whom held a dominant position on the 
market in Greece, to fully meet orders from pharmaceuticals wholesalers, constituted an 
abuse of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU.   
103 Kingston (2012) p. 117. See also Townley (2009) p. 255.  
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3.2 Economic Argumentation  
Another way of arguing why environmental factors should be taken into 
account in EU competition law, is by suggesting that environmental benefits 
constitute “objective economic benefits” as described in the Commissions 
Article 101(3) Guidelines.104 While the systematic argumentation above 
assumed that environmental protection constituted a non-economic factor, 
but nevertheless should be considered due to the structure of the Treaties, 
this line of argumentation proposes that environmental consideration is done 
within the consumer welfare approach.  
 
Scholars observed as early as in the 18th century that natural resources were 
finite. John Stuart Mill argued in 1865 that there were limits to economic 
expansion due to the limited quantity of land combined with a growing 
population. He argued that not only was endless economic expansion 
impossible, but also undesirable. The value of land could not simply be 
expressed in terms of agricultural effectiveness. Land had, according to 
Mill, an intrinsic value, which inevitably would be lost due to economic 
growth.105 The principle of limits to growth has become increasingly 
influential during the later half of the 20th century. The 1972 Club of Rome 
report, The Limits to Growth, found that the Earth’s resources were limited. 
Due to these limitations and the growth of population, industrialisation and 
pollution, the Earth’s ability to support its population will be reached within 
one hundred years.106 The limit of growth thesis has become a theoretical 
foundation for the policy development at an international level. At the EU 
level, the limits of growth thesis has inspired the Commissions 
Communication, GDP and Beyond, which held that GDP growth could not 
be the only measure of economic success.107 It was argued that 
incorporating social and environmental achievements as development 
indicators was vital to give a true reflection of long-term economic success. 
The limits of growth thesis highlights a fundamental problem; namely, that 
environmental resources are scarce, and an economic policy that does not 
support sustainable development will inevitably lead to economic 
degradation.108    
 
In neoclassic economics, the environment is regarded as a composite asset 
that offers a multitude of services.109 As with all other assets, it is rational to 
strive to enhance, or at least prevent depreciation of the value of this asset. 
The environment provides services directly to consumers; it might be the air 
we breathe, the nourishment we consume, or the pleasure of a beautiful 
landscape. Excessive waste will depreciate the value of the asset and reduce 
the services it provides; because of pollution the air becomes unbreathable, 
water becomes undrinkable and the landscape barren and unattractive.  
                                                
104 Article 101(3) Guidelines, para. 33.  
105 Montgomery (2012) p. 205.   
106 Club of Rome (1972) p. 183.  
107 COM (2009) 433 GDP and Beyond: Measuring Progress in a Changing World p. 3.  
108 Kingston (2012) p. 168.  
109 Tietenberg & Lewis (2012) p. 17.  
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The Commission’s goal for the competition policy is set out in paragraph 33 
in the Article 101(3) Guidelines and states that “[t]he aim of the Community 
competition rules is to protect competition on the market as a means of 
enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of 
resources.” An allocation of resourses is effective if the economic surplus 
derived from those resources is maximised by the allocation. Economic 
surplus is the sum of consumer and producer surplus.110  
 
Consumer welfare can be equated with consumer surplus.111 The goal of the 
EU competition rules, as defined by the Commission, is therefore to 
enhance consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is a basic economic concept, 
and is a measurement of the value the consumer places on a product minus 
what it costs to obtain it from the market. In other terms, the surplus of a 
specific consumer is the difference between how much a consumer is 
willing to pay for a product and how much the product cost to acquire on the 
market.112 The total consumer surplus is therefore the total willingness to 
pay for a category of goods in excess of its cost. A multitude of factors 
affects consumer surplus. For example, lower product quality or reduced 
consumer choice would reduce consumer surplus. A price increase would 
also lower the consumer surplus. Important to notice is that the cost of 
obtaining a product is not equal to its price. Environmental degradation 
caused by producing a specific good, for example CO2 emissions that lower 
the quality of air, is also a cost for the consumer. Environmental damage 
will consequently reduce consumer surplus.  
 
Environmental damage is a form of market failure.113 This type of market 
failure is described in neoclassic economical theory as “external effects”. 
Externalities occur whenever the welfare of one actor, it can be a firm or a 
household, depends not only on this actor’s activities, but also on activities 
under the control of another actor. Another way of describing it, is that 
external effects occur in situations where an actor does not fully bear all the 
cost and consequences of his own actions. For example, take two firms 
located by a river. The first firm is a steel manufacturer located upstream. 
The other firm is running a hotel downstream. Both firms use the river but 
in different ways. The steel manufacturer uses the river to clean its 
machines, with the result of waste being dumped into the river. The other 
firm uses the river for its natural beauty. Due to the fact that the steel 
manufacturer does not bear the cost of the reduced business of the hotel, it 
has no incentive to minimise its pollution. The steel manufacturer produces 
steel and pollution, but the damage to the water resource is not reflected in 
the steel firm’s costs. The price mechanism will fail to allocate resources 
efficiently, and output of the commodity, steel, will be too high. While the 
steel manufacturers economic surplus is maximised, the economic surplus 
for the hotel and its consumers will be reduced. This is the case for 
                                                
110 Tietenberg & Lewis (2012) p. 20. 
111 Jones & Sufrin (2014) p. 12. 
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113 Vedder (2003) p. 15.   
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everybody affected by the pollution. Depending on the span of the pollution, 
the economic surplus will be reduced for the society as a whole, because the 
allocation of resources is in reality not efficient on the steel market, because 
it does not bear all of its costs.114  
 
The same example may be used, but instead of looking at individual firms, 
we look at entire markets. Suppose all steel manufacturers emit pollution 
when producing steel. The consumers on the relevant market for steel will 
only bear a small part of the total cost of the pollution. Instead, the total cost 
of pollution will be carried by every consumer on every market. Even 
though workable competition is prevalent in the steel market, the pricing 
mechanism fails to allocate resources effectively and the overall economic 
surplus of the society is reduced.115  
 
This inefficient allocation of resources can be dealt with in different ways. 
The state concerned could penalize companies that emit more than a given 
amount of pollution each year.116 However, as we saw in section 2.2.2, there 
are several disadvantages with state regulation. First of all, state regulation 
will never encourage companies to reduce their emissions further than the 
set amount and be “more efficient”. Secondly, the “efficient” amount of 
pollution is very hard for the state to calculate. Thirdly, it may be considered 
a waste of public expenditure and an unwise use of time to legislate, 
administer and enforce pollution control in every industry.117 It may be 
more efficient to use market-based instruments.118 Market-based 
instruments include both taxing pollution, tradable emission vouchers and 
voluntary environmental agreements. These instruments force companies to 
internalise the cost of pollution in the relevant market, consequently 
affecting the pricing mechanism, reducing demand and decreasing output to 
an efficient level. A way of dealing with externalities is to let the firms on 
the relevant market enter into voluntary environmental agreements where 
the firms themselves choose how to internalise the costs. This may be done 
by setting emission standards, choosing a more environmentally friendly 
production process, or simply by reducing output to the efficient level. 
However, these types of agreements will result in a reduced economic 
surplus on the relevant market, consequently also reducing consumer 
surplus. Meanwhile, the economic surplus of society as a whole will 
increase. Here lies the crux of the issue. A competition policy that only 
focuses on maximising consumer surplus on the relevant market will not 
allow for such an agreement at the expense of society.  
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3.3 Conclusion  
The two lines of argument presented above hold that environmental 
concerns should be taken into account in Article 101 TFEU.  
 
The first line of argument adopted a teleological approach to the Treaties. 
The Treaties are pursuing a multitude of Union goals that often conflict with 
each other. Aiming at a high level of environmental protection and 
maintaining a sustainable development may conflict with keeping a highly 
competitive market economy. The EU courts have previously dealt with 
these kinds of conflicts through compromising within the implementation 
articles, such as Article 101 TFEU. When Treaty provisions are open-
textured enough, they should be interpreted to help other Treaty goals. This 
has been achieved by the EU Courts through a teleological and systematic 
interpretation of the Treaty. The Union’s goals to protect the environment 
are stated in Article 3.3 TEU, Article 11 TFEU and 191 TFEU. Article 11 
TFEU poses a concrete obligation that environmental concerns must be 
integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union's policies and 
activities. This is in line with ordoliberal theory, which holds that each 
economic decision must be viewed in relation to the greater economic 
constitution. By this view, it is fundamentally wrong to regard EU 
competition law as a special area in EU law isolated from environmental 
concerns. 
 
The second line of argument investigated the relationship between consumer 
welfare and the environment. We saw that the same neoclassic economic 
theory on which the Chicago School bases its competition theory, values the 
environment as a composite asset, providing services and benefits to all 
humans. Consequently, consumer welfare is dependent on how we use our 
environmental resources, and how we will be able to harness essential 
ecosystem services in the future. Environmental damage will have a direct 
and adverse effect on consumer welfare. Furthermore, an environmental 
benefit resulting from, for example, a production innovation reducing 
pollution, would increase consumer welfare. We also saw that even though 
workable competition is prevalent on the relevant market, the rivalry may 
not allocate resources efficiently due to external effects. These externalities 
can be dealt with through both direct regulation or market-based 
instruments. These two types of instruments have different pros and cons as 
we saw in section 2.2.2. However, a competition policy that solely focuses 
on enhancing consumer surplus in the relevant market will not allow 
environmental agreements that aim to internalise the cost of externalities, 
and which bring environmental benefits that ultimately increase total 
societal welfare. In sum, if the goal of competition law is to enhance 
consumer welfare, then the benefits of a clean environment, or conversely 
its degradation, become relevant in Article 101 TFEU.  
 
One last remark is essential. In order to be able to balance environmental 
benefits against anti-competitive effects on the relevant market, it is vital 
that benefits for the environment can be translated into “objective economic 
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benefits”. Many people would probably say that it is impossible to put a 
price on the environment. It is not possible to put a value on the beauty of 
nature; its value is intrinsic and beyond measurement. While this argument 
is valid, not placing a value on the environment leaves us with evaluating it 
at 0.119 For the sake of integrating competition and environmental law, we 
must put an instrumental value on environmental benefits. The primary 
difficulty lies in the fact that in contrast to private goods, no market and 
observable market price exists for many environmental goods. 
Environmental goods can be anything from agriculture, forestry, the 
generation of electricity, to breathable air and the beauty of nature. The 
challenge lies in developing techniques for evaluating environmental goods.  
 
The goal is to estimate the total willingness to pay for the environmental 
resource in question.120 Non-market evaluation is a complex field of study 
in environmental economics, and far beyond the scope of this essay. 
However, there are plenty of evaluation methods for non-market goods. One 
of these is the revealed preference approach, which is an indirect way of 
arriving at estimations. It derives its estimate by observing an individual’s 
behaviour in relation to ecosystem services. If, for example, an 
improvement in water quality would be followed by an increased demand 
for fishing licenses, the increase in demand could be used for evaluating 
water quality. It is also possible to compare product prices in different 
environmental conditions, for example, property prices.121 In sum, it seems 
possible to quantify environmental benefits into “objective economic 
benefits”.  
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4 Environmental policy in 
Article 101(1) TFEU 
4.1 Article 101(1) TFEU general  
The prohibition of anti-competitive agreements is found in Article 101(1) 
TFEU. The policy of Article 101(1) TFEU is to prohibit agreements 
between undertakings that have an object or effect of restricting 
competition. It is possible to distinguish four fundamental conditions in 
order for Article 101(1) TFEU to be applicable, namely: 
 
- An agreement must exist between the undertakings  
- The agreement must have as object or effect to restrict competition   
- The effect on competition must be appreciable  
- The agreement must have an appreciable effect on the trade between 
member states122  
 
The assessment whether the agreement is “restrictive of competition” has 
changed over time. In the past, before the “modernisation”, the Commission 
applied a formalistic approach towards agreements under the Article 101(1) 
TFEU assessment.123 The Commission was mostly concerned with whether 
the agreement restricted the commercial freedom of the involved parties. 
This formalistic approach took little account of the actual effects of the 
agreement in its economic context, rendering the prohibition overly broad. 
The Commission has, through the modernisation process, changed its 
analytical framework by accepting the consumer welfare standard.124 This 
analytical framework involves investigating the effects of the agreement in 
its economic context. Whether the parties’ freedom of action is somewhat 
reduced is relevant only if the reduced discretion has potential to harm 
consumer welfare. The assessment must take into account the potential 
competition that would have existed in the absence of the agreement. This 
approach is in line with the EU Courts’ jurisprudence, which was 
summarised in Métropole Télévision.125 The Court of First Instance held that 
the analysis under Article 101(1) TFEU is confined to whether the 
agreement at issue produces anti-competitive effects. The assessment as to 
whether it also produces pro-competitive effects must the done under 
Article 101(3) TFEU. In connection with this statement, the Court rejected 
                                                
122 Whish & Bailey (2012) p. 99. 
123 Lugard & Hancer, European Competition Law Review (2004) p. 410.  
124 Monti (2007) p. 21.  
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the notion that Article 101(1) TFEU would allow for a so-called “rule of 
reason”.126 
 
While the approach when analysing an agreement is clear from the 
paragraph above, the concept of “restriction of competition” remains 
difficult to grasp. There is still a vast debate as to what this concept 
entails.127 Monti suggests that competition law has three core values: 
economic freedom, market integration and efficiency.128 If an agreement 
infringes any of these values, it is restrictive of competition in the meaning 
of Article 101(1) TFEU. The Commission’s view, which appears in the 
Article 101(3) Guidelines, is that in order for Article 101(1) TFEU to be 
infringed, the agreement in question must decrease consumer welfare.129 
The objective of Article 101(1) TFEU is to protect competition as a means 
of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of 
resources.130 As described in Chapter 3.2, consumer welfare is equated with 
consumer surplus, and is reduced, for example, when prices are raised above 
competitive level. These negative effects are likely to occur only when the 
parties possess market power.131 When determining if competition is 
restricted in the sense of Article 101(1) TFEU, the principal question seems 
to be whether the agreement is likely to negatively effect competition by 
increasing the undertakings’ ability to raise prices, reduce output, quality, or 
innovation.132 Consequently, it seems that among the three core values 
presented by Monti, the Commissions regards efficiency as most important.  
 
It is not necessary to establish any anti-competitive effects if the agreement 
has been found to be restrictive by object.133 The Court of Justice has stated 
that an agreement is restrictive by object when it is restrictive by its very 
nature. An agreement is restrictive by its very nature when it concerns price 
fixing, market sharing or output restrictions. Just because an agreement has 
public policy aims does not exclude it from being deemed to restrict 
competition by object, which was concluded in GlaxoSmithKline.134 
Consequently, an agreement that is deemed restrictive by object would not 
be “saved” from falling under Article 101(1) TFEU, even though it carries 
substantive environmental benefits. Conversely, an agreement that has as an 
object to cause environmental damage, but otherwise is not restrictive of 
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competition, does not fall under Article 101(1) TFEU, as we saw in Chapter 
3.1. Article 101(1) TFEU is, by its wording, limited to prohibit agreements 
that are restrictive of competition.135  
 
Even though the Court of First Instance made clear in Métropole télévision 
that no balancing of pro- and anti-competitive effects of an agreement was 
to occur under Article 101(1) TFEU, the EU Courts have in several cases 
accepted restrictive agreements under Article 101(1) TFEU because of their 
beneficial objectives. This is the so-called ancillary restraint doctrine. 
Before we discuss this further we will first investigate how environmental 
agreements have been assessed under Article 101(1) TFEU.   
 
4.2 Article 101(1) TFEU and 
Environmental Agreements  
The main type of environmental protection instrument that might infringe 
Article 101 TFEU is the so-called voluntary environmental agreement. In a 
communication from 2002, published by the Directorate General 
Environment, the Commission identified environmental agreements as 
“those by which stakeholders undertake to achieve pollution abatement, as 
defined by environmental law, or environmental objectives set out in Article 
[191 TFEU].”136 The importance of environmental agreements and the 
increased use of market-based instruments in EU environmental policy were 
emphasised in the communication.  
 
The 2001 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, published by the Directorate 
General Competition, contained a separate chapter dealing with 
environmental agreements. It described the requirements for an 
environmental agreement, and how these were assessed under Article 101 
TFEU.137 This chapter was excluded in the new 2010 Horizontal 
Cooperation Guidelines.138 The 2010 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines 
merely provides some guidance on how to assess environmental standard 
agreements. However, the Commission has stated that the extraction of the 
environmental chapter does not imply any downgrading for the assessment 
of environmental agreements.139 Consequently, the 2001 Horizontal 
Cooperation Guidelines might still give some guidance on how to analyse 
environmental agreements in the absence of the EU courts’ jurisprudence.140  
 
                                                
135 Kingston (2012) p. 229. 
136 COM(2002) 412 Environmental Agreements at Community Level Within the 
Framework of the Action Plan on the Simplification and Improvement of the Regulatory 
Environment, p. 4. 
137 2001 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, para. 179.  
138 2010 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines. 
139 Commission Press Release, Competition: Commission adopts revised competition rules 
on horizontal co-operation agreements, 2010 p. 4.   
140 Kingston (2012) p. 243.  
 33 
The 2001 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines separated environmental 
agreements into three categories: those that never fall under, those that may 
fall under, and those that always fall under Article 101(1) TFEU.  
 
An environmental agreement will not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU in three 
situations. First, if the agreement does not place any precise individual 
obligations upon any of the parties, or if the parties are just loosely 
committed to achieve a sector-wide environmental target, Article 101(1) 
TFEU is not infringed.141 This is dependent on what degree of discretion the 
parties have to obtain the environmental goals after concluding the 
agreement. In ACEA, the Commission found that an agreement among 
automobile manufacturers to reduce the amount CO2 from its cars did not 
infringe Article 101(1) TFEU.142 The reason was that the parties had only 
agreed upon a sector-wide emissions aim, and the parties were free to decide 
how to achieve this aim individually. The Commission found that this 
would encourage ACEA’s members to develop and introduce new CO2-
efficient technologies independently. Secondly, Article 101(1) TFEU should 
not be infringed if the agreement concerns products whose importance is 
marginal for influencing purchase decisions on the market.143 Thirdly, if the 
agreement generates dynamic efficiencies, which could not have been 
obtained without the agreement, Article 101(1) TFEU should not be 
relevant. Dynamic efficiencies are generated if the agreement gives rise to a 
new market or product.144 The 2010 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines 
expresses “if the agreement enables the parties to launch a new product or 
service, which, […] the parties would not otherwise have been able to 
do”.145   
 
Conversely, the environmental agreement will always fall under Article 
101(1) TFEU where the cooperation does not truly concern environmental 
objectives, but serves only as a front to a disguised cartel.146 An example is 
the IAZ case, where the Belgian Association Nationale des Service d’Eau 
agreed with all manufactures and importers of washing machines to use a 
conformity label for certain environmental requirements. The Court of 
Justice found that the real objective was to hinder parallel imports by 
creating entry barriers.147 Furthermore, agreements that fix prices, reduce 
output or allocate market shares, always fall under Article 101(1) TFEU, 
even where the expressed objective is environmentally friendly. This was 
the case in VOTOB, where an agreement between six Dutch companies fell 
under Article 101(1) TFEU. The Commission found that the agreement to 
pass on a fixed environmental surcharge to consumers due to the cost of 
storing used chemicals constituted horizontal price fixing.148  
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Finally, there are some borderline cases, which may fall under Article 
101(1) TFEU depending on the effects on the concerned market. The 
Commission has stated that an infringement is most likely to occur when the 
agreement covers a major share of the relevant market and, when the 
agreement has a binding effect on individual actors.149 An agreement may, 
for example, fall under Article 101(1) TFEU if the two parties are dominant 
actors on the market and the agreement substantially restricts the parties’ 
discretion to devise the characteristics of their products, or substantially 
effects output on the market.150 Environmental standard agreements for 
product and production processes that significantly affect a large proportion 
of the parties’ sales may infringe Article 101(1) TFEU.151 Furthermore, 
environmental standards may be deemed unlawful under Article 101(1) 
TFEU when they are restrictive of price competition, constitute barriers to 
entry or give rise to excessive information exchange regarding prices. In 
CECED, the Commission found that an agreement, which set standards for 
energy consumption between importers and producers of washing machines, 
infringed Article 101(1) TFEU, because the parties held 95% of the relevant 
market.152 However, where environmental standards are non-discriminatory, 
transparent, and open to all market actors, environmental standardisation 
agreements do not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU.153 An example would be 
to create a private eco-label, or to set environmental standards for certain 
products. If such standards have been agreed upon in an open and 
transparent manner, and are freely accessible to all market actors, it would 
not constitute a breach of Article 101(1) TFEU.154 Agreements infringing 
Article 101(1) TFEU may however be saved by Article 101(3) TFEU.155 
 
4.3 The Ancillary Restraint Doctrine  
In some judgements, the Court of Justice has held that even if an agreement 
contains severe restrictions of competition, it might not infringe Article 
101(1) TFEU if the restraints do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
a legitimate objective.156 Case law from the EU courts show that when 
considering whether an agreement has an anti-competitive effect on the 
market, it is possible to argue that the restrictions are necessary to enable the 
parties to obtain a legitimate commercial purpose.157 For example, in Société 
Technique Minière, the Court of Justice said that an agreement conferring 
exclusivity on a distributor, which poses large restrictions on competition, 
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might not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU when it is “really necessary for the 
penetration of a new area by an undertaking”.158 In order to be deemed 
necessary, the restriction must be objectively needed for the implementation 
of the main transaction, and proportionate to it. The EU courts have 
reasoned similarly in a large number of cases. The EU courts have followed 
this line of thought when assessing restrictive agreements with public policy 
objectives in a few particular cases, the most prominent being Wouters.159 
Consequently, the EU courts have balanced public policy against 
competition restrictions within Article 101(1) TFEU.  
 
In Wouters, a Dutch lawyer was prohibited from practicing as a lawyer in a 
firm of accountants, by a rule adopted by the Dutch Bar Council, which 
prevented lawyers from entering into partnerships with non-lawyers. The 
Court of Justice acknowledged that this kind of rule was restrictive in the 
meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. However, the Court of Justice held that 
the rule was not violating Article 101(1) TFEU “since that body [the bar 
association] could reasonably have considered that that regulation, despite 
the effects restrictive of competition that are inherent in it, is necessary for 
the proper practice of the legal profession”.160 Consequently, the Court of 
Justice held that account had to be taken to the objectives of the restriction, 
and the overall context in which they were adopted.161 In this case, the 
objectives of the rules were to ensure the integrity and professionalism of 
legal service providers in the Netherlands. Ultimately, even though the rules 
adopted by the bar association were deemed anti-competitive, the Court of 
Justice concluded that the agreement did not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU, 
as the restraints were necessary for the proper practice of the legal 
profession. The Court found that the Bar of Netherlands could not pursue 
this aim by less restrictive means. Finally, the restrictive effects did not go 
beyond what was necessary. Consequently, the Court of Justice balanced the 
public policy interest of proper practice of the legal profession against the 
restrictions of competition, using the proportionality test.162      
 
In Albany, the Court of Justice held that collective bargaining between 
organisations representing employers and employees fall outside the scope 
of Article 101(1) TFEU.163 The Court reasoned that the Union’s activities 
included not only competition policy, but also a policy in the social sphere. 
“It therefore follows from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty 
as a whole which is both effective and consistent that agreements concluded 
in the context of collective negotiations between management and labour in 
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pursuit of such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be 
regarded as falling outside the scope of Article [101] of the Treaty”.164 The 
conclusion drawn by the Court was that certain competitive restrictions are 
inherent in collective agreements, and for this reason fall outside of Article 
101(1) TFEU. 
 
Another similar judgment was given in Meca-Medina, where the Court of 
Justice decided that anti-doping rules, in a sport context, did not infringe 
Article 101(1) TFEU.165 Even though the rules were restrictive of 
competition, they had a legitimate objective, namely, to combat drug use in 
order for competitive sports to be conducted fairly.  
 
In sum, these judgements tell us that in certain cases it is possible to balance 
non-competition objectives against restrictions of competition, where the 
non-competition objectives can outweigh the restriction, with the 
consequence that Article 101(1) TFEU is not infringed. The question is 
whether this principle of ancillary restraints can apply by analogy to 
restrictions ancillary to environmental agreements. It has been argued that 
these cases must be interpreted narrowly and that the ancillary restraint 
principle only applies to collective bargaining and self-regulation by 
professional associations.166 It is important to read these cases restrictively 
in order to prevent the EU competition assessment from being too open to 
political consideration. However, while acknowledging this, Kingston 
argues that the ancillary restraint principle is relevant to environmental 
agreements. She writes “where a competitive restriction is objectively 
necessary to the achievement of an agreement’s environmental objectives 
such that the agreement would not otherwise have been entered into 
(Albany), or is necessary to carry out an environmental regulatory task 
(Wouters), it is possible to interpret Article 101(1) TFEU in a way that 
favours environmental protection.167  
 
Other scholars downplay the relevance of these cases. Jones & Sufrin 
maintain that if balancing is required under Article 101(1) TFEU, the two-
folded system of Article 101 TFEU becomes problematic.168 Not all public 
policy justifications should be taken into account in Article 101(1) TFEU, 
because it would render Article 101(3) TFEU redundant, which in turn 
would go against the wording of the Treaty. Therefore, it is required to 
make a subtle interpretation of ancillary restraint case law.      
 
Whish & Bailey suggest that there are two types of balancing operations 
allowed under Article 101(1) TFEU. In Société Technique Minière, the 
restrictions were ancillary to a legitimate commercial operation, while in 
                                                
164 Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds 
Textielindustrie [1999] I-5751 para. 60. 
165 Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991.  
166 Kingston (2012) p. 236.  
167 Ibid., p. 240 
168 Jones & Sufrin (2014) p. 249.  
 37 
Wouters, the restrictions were ancillary to a regulatory concern.169 This 
would limit the balancing operation allowed under Article 101(1) TFEU to 
these types of situations. In cases like Wouters, balancing would only be 
relevant to achieve a regulatory aim. Furthermore, the restrictions must be 
directly relevant and necessary to the implementation of the main operation.  
 
Townley questions whether making a link to the ancillary restraints doctrine 
is appropriate. The doctrine is extremely imprecise and “begs more 
questions than it answers and is exceedingly difficult to apply”.170 Neither 
the Courts nor the Commission have given any explanation why balancing 
has been allowed in Article 101(1) TFEU.171 Whish writes that “if it were 
not for the procedural difficulties [in Wouters and Albany], analysis of the 
policy objectives under Article 101(3) would seem to be the natural way to 
proceed, given the bifurcated structure of Article 101”.172 The difficulties 
he speaks of refer to the fact that these cases were tried before the 
modernisation process in 2004, where the Commission had the monopoly on 
approving agreements under 101(3) TFEU after they had been notified. 
Consequently, in these particular cases, if the agreements would have been 
found to infringe on Article 101(1) TFEU, they would have been declared 
void under Article 101(2) TFEU, which would have had awkward 
consequences for the member states in question. Townley suggests that the 
rulings in Wouters and Albany were an attempt by the Court of Justice to 
reach the “right” result in the specific case. “Now that those procedural 
rules are no longer in place, the notification regime has gone and the whole 
of Article [101] is directly applicable, one might argue that there should be 
no more cases like Wouters, and thus no more balancing within Article 
101(1)”. 173  
 
However, in Oficiais de Contas, concerning rules adopted by a professional 
association of accountants who demanded obligatory training for its 
members, the EU court of Justice confirmed the relevance of Wouters.174   
4.4 Conclusion  
When assessing an agreement’s anti-competitive effects under Article 
101(1) TFEU, the central question is whether the agreement is likely to 
negatively affect competition by increasing the undertakings ability to raise 
prices, reduce output, reduce quality or innovation, i.e. reduce consumer 
welfare. This is done by investigating the agreement’s effect in its economic 
context. In accordance with Métropole Télévision, potential efficiencies, 
such as environmental benefits, should not be taken into account under 
Article 101(1) TFEU. Article 101(1) TFEU is only concerned with the 
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effects on competition. Consequently, environmental agreements are 
assessed under Article 101(1) TFEU using the same principles as for non-
environmental agreements.  
 
The 2001 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines provide some guidance as to 
how to assess environmental agreements. These guidelines have a 
formalistic approach to the agreements, focusing on the freedom of the 
market actors. If an environmental agreement has a binding effect on the 
market actors, it will infringe Article 101(1) TFEU. Yet, the formalistic 
approach has been abandoned in favour of the consumer welfare approach 
since 2004. This might suggest that the Commission will have a more 
efficiency-oriented approach towards environmental agreements, and this 
might also be the reason why the chapter was excluded in the new 2010 
Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines.   
 
Even though Métropole Télévision firmly rejected the balancing of negative 
and positive effects of an agreement under Article 101(1) TFEU, the 
ancillary restraint doctrine diffuses the picture. Oficiais de Contas confirm 
the jurisprudence under Wouters. It is consequently possible to balance 
public policy against restrictions of competition under certain 
circumstances, with the result of rendering Article 101(1) TFEU 
inapplicable. Article 101(1) TFEU has not been deemed infringed in the 
cases where the competitive restrictions are regarded inherent in, or 
ancillary to, an agreement’s legitimate non-competition objectives. 
Although there is considerable doubt when and where a balancing may be 
performed, there are reasons to believe it is possible.   
 
The question is whether environmental agreements under some 
circumstances may fall under the ancillary restraint doctrine. In the absence 
of precise guidance, one should proceed with caution. There seems to be 
little consensus among scholars as to what the jurisprudence under Wouters 
actually entails. One possible guess is that the ancillary restraint doctrine is 
applicable in a context where restrictions in an agreement between private 
undertakings are necessary to perform an environmental regulatory task, 
where normally such a task would have been carried out by the state. 
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5 Environmental policy in 
Article 101(3) TFEU  
5.1 Article 101(3) TFEU general  
The overall assessment of Article 101 TFEU is split into two parts. If it has 
been established that an agreement is restrictive of competition in the 
meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, it may nevertheless be accepted under 
Article 101(3) TFEU if it can be proven that the agreement produces pro-
competitive benefits that outweigh the anti-competitive effects. If the 
overall effects are beneficial for consumers, the agreement should be held 
compatible with Article 101 TFEU. Article 101(3) TFEU thereby 
constitutes a general legal exception to the prohibition of anti-competitive 
agreements. In order to satisfy Article 101(3) TFEU, the agreement must 
fulfil four cumulative conditions, two positive and two negative175: 
 
- The agreement must contribute to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economical 
progress. 
- The consumers must be allowed a fair share of the resulting benefits. 
- The agreements must not impose restrictions that are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives on the concerned 
undertakings. 
- The agreement must not afford such undertakings the possibility of 
eliminating competition in a substantial part of the production in 
question.  
 
Before 1 May 2004, the Commission had an exclusive right to grant an 
exception under Article 101(3) TFEU if companies notified the Commission 
about the agreement beforehand. However, the system of notification was 
abolished by Council Regulation 1/2003, and since then Article 101(3) 
TFEU has been directly applicable to all agreements. The Commission 
shares the competence of approving agreements with national courts and 
national competition authorities. Whish & Bailey maintain that before 2004, 
when the Commission enjoyed somewhat of a “margin of appreciation”, 
factors other than purely economic ones could be applied in the assessment 
under Article 101(3) TFEU.176 It is no longer possible to notify an authority 
about an agreement; either the agreement satisfies Article 101(3) TFEU or it 
does not. The undertakings concerned bear the risk of their agreement 
constituting a breach of Article 101(1) TFEU. Article 2 of Regulation 
1/2003 stipulates that the burden of proof rests on the Commission or a 
national competition authority to show that the agreement in question 
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infringes Article 101(1) TFEU.177 However, once an infringement has been 
established, the burden of proof shifts to the concerned undertaking to show 
that the agreement satisfies the four conditions in Article 101(3).178  
 
When the Commission’s “monopoly” on deciding whether to grant 
individual exceptions under Article 101(3) TFEU was abolished in 2004, 
concerns were raised that national competition authorities and national 
courts would apply the statute inconsistently because it was overly broad. A 
second fear was that the government would influence its national 
competition agencies to pursue other social policies at the expense of 
competition.179 This fear is reflected in the White Paper on the 
Modernisation of Article 101 TFEU, which stated that “[a]rticle [101(3) 
TFEU] is intended to provide a legal framework for the economic 
assessment of restrictive practices and not to allow the application of the 
competition rules to be set aside because of political considerations”.180 It 
was argued that it was unwise to let national courts balance public policy 
issues against the cost of anti-competitive agreements in the Article 101(3) 
TFEU assessment.181    
5.2 Public policy balancing in Article 
101(3) TFEU 
The question is whether an environmental agreement that brings 
environmental benefits of some sort, but is restrictive of competition and 
therefore infringes Article 101(1) TFEU, may be declared lawful through 
the exception in Article 101(3) TFEU. The problem is, as has already been 
explained, the Commission’s new consumer welfare approach and its 
requirements on “objective economic benefits”.  
 
EU case law shows that public policy benefits, i.e. non-economic benefits, 
have been considered under Article 101(3) TFEU in the past. The Court of 
First Instance stated in Métropole Télévision that “[i]n the context of an 
overall assessment, the Commission is entitled to base itself on 
considerations connected with the pursuit of the public interest in order to 
grant exemption under Article [101(3)] of the Treaty.”182 In Metro, the 
Court of Justice held that employment policy was a relevant factor under the 
first condition in Article 101(3) TFEU. It was considered “a stabilising 
factor with regard to the provision of employment which, since it improves 
the general conditions of production, especially when market conditions are 
unfavourable, comes within the framework of the objectives to which 
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reference may be had pursuant to Article [101(3)].”183  Furthermore, in 
Metro II, the court held that objects of a different nature than those of 
competition law may justify competitive restrictions, if proportionate.184 In 
DSD, the Court of First Instance indirectly confirmed that environmental 
protection, in the form of better waste management, justified an exception 
under Article 101(3) TFEU.185 This case law shows that the EU courts have 
been open to include public policy benefits in the Article 101(3) TFEU 
assessment.186  
 
The Commission has also had an open approach towards public policy 
balancing in Article 101(3) TFEU. In the XXIth Report on Competition 
Policy, the Commission said, “it would be wrong to look at the 
Community’s competition policy in isolation from other policies”.187 It was 
argued that the link between competition law and other Community 
objectives was a “two-way process”: competition policy helped to achieve 
other goals, while competition policy could be applied in direct reference to 
other objectives.188 The Council, as well as the Parliament, supported this 
view in several documents.189 
 
Since the ”modernisation” of the EU competition law in 2004, there have 
been few cases dealing with the application of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
Consequently, there is little jurisprudence available for interpreting the four 
criteria. In the absence of guiding case law, the Commission’s Article 
101(3) Guidelines are a valuable instrument for interpreting Article 101(3) 
TFEU. Whish & Bailey maintain that the Article 101(3) Guidelines should 
be applied in a “reasonably and flexibly manner rather than in a mechanical 
manner”.190 However, these guidelines are at times difficult to reconcile 
with the approach previously taken by the EU courts, and by past decisions 
made by the Commission, as well as the Treaty’s objectives and goals.191 It 
must be kept in mind that Commission Guidelines only constitute “soft 
law”, and cannot alone change the legal situation.192 
 
The Commission states in its Article 101(3) Guidelines that Article 101(3) 
TFEU is concerned with consumer welfare and to ensure efficient allocation 
of resources.193 The role of Article 101(3) TFEU is to determine, when an 
agreement has been found infringing Article 101(1) TFEU, the “positive 
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economic effects of the agreement”.194 Benefits can be taken into account if 
they can be calculated into objective economic benefits. The concerned 
party must show that even though the agreement restricts competition, the 
economic activity that is the object of the agreement will lead to other 
benefits.195 If the pro-competitive effects outweigh the anti-competitive 
effects, the agreement is exempted from the prohibition.196  
 
By pro-competitive effects, the Commission is referring to efficiency gains 
that “create additional value by lowering the cost of producing an output, 
improving the quality of the product, or creating a new product”.197 The 
benefits must be quantified in order for balancing to be performed against 
the negative effects.198 The Commission separates between “cost 
efficiencies” and “efficiencies of a qualitative nature”. Cost efficiencies may 
follow from the development of new production technologies, synergies 
resulting from the integration of existing assets, and economies of scale and 
scope.199 Qualitative efficiencies may, for example, arise from technical 
advances ensued from research and development agreements.200 
 
The Commission states that the four conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU are 
exhaustive and an exemption may not be made on any other condition. 
Concerning other Treaty goals, such as environmental protection, the 
Commission states, “goals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be taken 
into account to the extent that they can be subsumed under the four 
conditions of Article [101(3)]”.201 In sum, environmental concerns may be 
taken into account, as long as they enhance consumer welfare and an 
efficient allocation of resources.202 
 
According to the Commission, non-economic goals can only be of ancillary 
relevance in the assessment. The Commission supports its view by reference 
to the Matra case, where a future joint venture between two major 
automobile manufacturers in Portugal was under scrutiny. The joint venture 
would lead to a large number of jobs and foreign investment in one of the 
poorest regions in Europe, which in turn would lead to reduced disparities 
within the Union. However, the Commission held that this “would not be 
enough to make an exemption possible unless the conditions of Article 
[101(3)] were fulfilled, but it is an element which the Commission has taken 
into account”.203 
 
This narrow interpretation of Article 101(3) TFEU favoured by the 
Commission, would only permit agreements that generated improvements in 
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economic efficiency. According to this view, Article 101(3) TFEU would 
consequently only allow balancing the restrictive effects of an agreement 
under Article 101(1) TFEU against the increase of economic efficiency. 
Whish & Bailey support this way of interpreting Article 101 TFEU.204 They 
maintain that Article 101(1) TFEU assesses whether the agreement could 
lead to allocative inefficiencies, whereas Article 101(3) TFEU permits the 
agreement if it compensates the loss with productive efficiency. Whish & 
Bailey argue that the national competition authorities and national courts are 
ill placed to consider public policy objectives in Article 101(3) TFEU due to 
the diverse interests within each member state. The application of Article 
101(3) TFEU would be inconsistent in the Union and, therefore, is a narrow 
view of Article 101(3) TFEU preferred.205 Odudu agrees with this view: 
Article 101(1) TFEU involves an inquiry into whether allocative efficiency 
is reduced by the agreement, while Article 101(3) TFEU involves an inquiry 
into whether the allocative inefficiencies are compensated by productive 
efficiencies.206 Productive efficiencies should be equated with technical 
progress that lead to new and better products, raising the standard of living. 
The pursuit of legal certainty and uniformity in decision-making is superior 
to the use of competition law as an instrument to obtain the Treaties’ 
objectives. 
 
Townley, on the other hand, argues that a consumer welfare test should be 
done exclusively under Article 101(1) TFEU, which means measuring 
allocative efficiencies. This leaves Article 101(3) TFEU open to balance a 
multitude of public policy objectives against anti-competitive effects, in 
accordance with the Métropole Télévision judgement.207 The Courts have 
not since the modernisation taken a position regarding the broad or the 
narrow view of Article 101(3) TFEU.208  
 
In sum, there is still a raging debate, despite the Article 101(3) Guidelines, 
as to whether public policy has a role in Article 101(3) TFEU. The Article 
101(3) Guidelines does not explicitly exclude the relevance of other Treaty 
goals under Article 101(3) TFEU, but in order for a Treaty goal to be 
relevant, it must fulfil the four conditions outlined. Consequently, the 
relevance of environmental benefits in the competitive assessment depends 
on whether those benefits can be subsumed under the conditions of Article 
101(3) TFEU.  
 
5.2.1 First condition – Benefits  
The issue of how environmental factors should be taken into account in 
under Article 101(3) TFEU comes down to the interpretation of the first 
condition of Article 101(3) TFEU. The central question is whether 
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environmental benefits constitute improving the “production or distribution 
of goods”, or promoting “technical or economic progress”?  
 
Before the modernisation in 2004, many of the Commission’s competition 
policy documents supported the relevance of environmental factors. In its 
XXVth Report on Competition Policy, the Commission held that restrictions 
on competition could be weighed against environmental benefits using the 
principle of proportionality. Improving the environment was, according to 
the Commission, to be regarded as a factor that improved production or 
distribution, or promoted economic or technical progress.209 Furthermore, 
the 2001 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines directly addressed the case 
where environmental benefits arising from an agreement could be evaluated 
economically. It held that “[e]nvironmental agreements caught by Article 
[101(3)] may attain economic benefits which, … , outweigh their negative 
effects on competition. To fulfil this condition, there must be net benefits in 
terms of reduced environmental pressure resulting from the agreement, as 
compared to a baseline where no action is taken. In other words, the 
expected economic benefits must outweigh the costs.”210 In the following 
paragraph, the 2001 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines stated that the 
benefits should be assessed in two stages. Where the individual consumers 
have a positive rate of return under reasonable payback periods, there is no 
need to evaluate the aggregated positive return to consumers in general. If 
this is not the case, then the aggregated societal benefits should be 
objectively calculated and assessed.211 This statement implies that the 
interpretation of “consumer” might encompass society in its entirety.212  
 
Kingston maintains that the statement in the 2001 Horizontal Cooperation 
Guidelines was “an important step towards the internalisation of 
environmental costs and benefits in EU competition analysis and, in turn, 
towards achieving integration of the EU’s environmental and competition 
policies”.213 Consequently, if environmental benefits can be calculated into 
objective economic benefits, the Commission’s 2001 Horizontal Guidelines 
support that they should be taken into account. As already discussed in 
Chapter 4.2, this environmental chapter was excluded in the new 2010 
Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, but as the Commission has held, this 
did not entail any “downgrading for the assessment of environmental 
agreements”.214   
 
The Commission has taken environmental protection into account in its 
decisional practice concerning Article 101(3) TFEU as far back as 1983, 
when it decided on the Carbon Gas Technologie.215 In its early decisions, 
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the environmental benefits were of little consequence in comparison to 
restriction of competition, and no exceptions were granted on environmental 
benefits alone.216 However, environmental protection has enjoyed an 
increased influence in the Treaty, and consequently has grown more 
important in the Article 101 TFEU assessment.  
 
In EACEM, the Commission approved an agreement between the European 
Association of Consumer Electronics Manufacturers and 16 of its members, 
all of which were major producers of television and video recorders.217 The 
producers had entered into a voluntary commitment to reduce their 
products’ energy consumption in stand-by mode. No individual firm was 
able to introduce reduced energy consuming machines due to large costs and 
small margins in the industry. The commitment would increase prices for 
customers and was of such binding character that the Commission found it 
infringing Article 101(1) TFEU. However, the Commission found the 
environmental benefits constituted technical and economic progress under 
the first condition. The Commission stated that: “The energy saving could 
amount to 3.2 TWh a year from 2005. This reduction in energy consumption 
will have a significant impact in terms of the management of energy 
resources, reductions in CO2 emissions and, accordingly, measures to 
counter global warming.”218 
 
Two years later, the Commission took a similar decision in CECED. 
Manufacturers and importers of washing machines, which together 
accounted for 95% of the relevant market, agreed upon discontinuing 
production and importation of the least energy efficient washing machines. 
The objective of the agreement was to pursue a collective energy efficiency 
target and to develop more environmental friendly products.219 The 
agreement was deemed restrictive of competition in the meaning of Article 
101(1) TFEU because the parties bound themselves to cease producing and 
importing certain types of washing machines. This would bring anti-
competitive effects in terms of price increases and reduced technical 
availability for consumers. The Commission also noted that the agreement 
would involve information exchange and cooperation between the 
competitors. Nonetheless, the Commission granted an exception under 
Article 101(3) TFEU because the environmental benefits for the society 
outweighed the costs. The parties could show that energy consumption 
would be reduced up to 20%, with the result of 7,5 TWh saved by 2015. 
CECED could also show estimations that 3,4 million ton CO2 emissions 
would be avoided. Individual consumers would experience cost savings 
through reduced electricity bills, and a vague estimated said that they would 
recoup the price increase within 9 to 40 months. The Commission also 
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estimated that savings in marginal damage from CO2 emissions would be 41 
to 61 € per ton, and in relation to that stated, “the benefits to the society 
brought about by the CECED agreement appear to be more than seven 
times greater than the increased purchase cost of more energy-efficient 
washing machines. Such environmental results for society would adequately 
allow consumers a fair share of the benefits even if no benefits accrued to 
individual purchasers of machines”.220 Acting Competition Commissioner 
at the time, Mario Monti, commented on the decisions, and said that 
environmental concerns were in no way contradictory to competition 
policy.221   
 
In DSD, the Commission granted an exception under Article 101(3) TFEU 
for a nationwide collection and recycling system established by 95 
undertakings from packaging industries in Germany.222 This operation was 
designed to meet the requirements of German national law concerning waste 
management. The system was run by DSD, a private undertaking, who 
entered into exclusive recycling agreements with local collectors. These 
exclusive agreements were restrictive of competition in the meaning of 
Article 101(1) TFEU. However, the Commission found the exclusive 
agreement necessary to obtain the environmental objectives, consequently 
saying the agreement “contributes to improving the production of goods and 
to promoting technical or economic progress.”223 The Commission’s 
decision was later confirmed by the Court of First Instance.224 The Court 
never directly addressed the question of whether the environmental benefits 
fulfilled the first condition, because this matter was never appealed. 
However, the Court found that the restrictions were proportionate for 
attaining the environmental objective.225     
 
In sum, the decisional practice of the Commission shows that environmental 
benefits fulfil the first criteria insofar as they can be subsumed into 
objective economic benefits. In none of the decisions above (EACEM, 
CECED, DSD) were the environmental benefits subsumed into direct cost 
savings for the individual consumer. Rather, the main reason for exemption 
was the overall cost benefit for society as a whole.  
 
5.2.2 Second condition – A fair share to 
consumers 
To fulfil the second condition, also called “the pass-on condition”, the 
concerned undertakings must demonstrate that a fair share of the resulting 
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benefits will accrue to the consumers in the relevant market.226 
Environmental benefits are typically diffused and not often specifically 
addressed to the consumers in the relevant market. Furthermore, the 
beneficial effects might not occur immediately. The Article 101(3) 
Guidelines states, “the concept of “consumers” encompasses all direct or 
indirect users of the products covered by the agreement, including 
producers that use the products as an input, wholesalers, retailers and final 
customers”.227 The Article 101(3) Guidelines also state that the assessment 
made under Article 101(3) should be made within the confines of each 
relevant market.228  
 
It might seem like this definition excludes the relevance of consumers 
outside the relevant market. However, in the CECED decision discussed 
above, the Commission considered the “collective environmental benefits”, 
stating that the environmental benefits flowing from the agreement “would 
adequately allow consumers a fair share of the benefits even if no benefits 
accrued to individual purchasers of machines”.229 The conclusion from this 
case is that the overall effect on all markets can be taken into account in the 
economic assessment. This view is supported by Vedder, who advocates a 
broad definition of “consumers”. He maintains that the environmental 
policy-linking clause in Article 11 TFEU allows for the societal benefit as a 
whole to be taken into account.230  
 
The concept of “a fair share” is described by the Commission in the Article 
101(3) Guidelines and implies that the passed-on benefits must compensate 
at least the consumers for the adverse impact of the anti-competitive 
agreement.231 However, it did not seem like the consumers in CECED 
individually were fully compensated. Nevertheless, the environmental 
benefits must be felt by the consumers in the relevant market.232  
 
Another issue is whether future generations should be included in the 
consumer concept. This is especially relevant concerning long-term 
environmental goals such as combating climate change. The Article 101(3) 
Guidelines takes a surprisingly broad approach and states, “the fact that 
pass-on to the consumers occurs with a certain time lag does not in itself 
exclude the application of Article [101(3)]. However, the greater the time 
lag, the greater must the efficiencies to compensate also for the loss to 
consumers during the period preceding the pass-on.”233  
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5.2.3 Third condition – Indispensability 
The third condition requires that the restrictions are indispensable for 
obtaining the agreement’s objective. Kingston holds that this condition 
involves the principle of proportionality.234 The parties are required to show 
that the efficiencies are specific to the agreement in the sense that “there are 
no other economically practicable and less restrictive means of achieving 
the efficiencies”.235 Townley maintains that “practicable and less restrictive 
means” includes not only other types of agreements available for the parties, 
but also whether the objective can be obtained by any other means, which 
includes direct regulation.236 Consequently, Townley advocated a very 
narrow interpretation of the third condition. 
 
The indispensability-test is applied to an environmental agreement in the 
same way as to any other type of restrictive agreement. Many environmental 
agreements have failed to fulfil this criterion, because even though the 
environmental objective was genuine, the agreement’s provisions were 
found disproportionately restrictive.237 It is unlikely that hardcore 
restrictions are considered indispensable.238 In the VOTOB case, the 
Commission found that an agreement between six tank storage operators 
failed to fulfil the third condition.239 The six undertakings had agreed on 
adding a fixed environmental surcharge to all tariffs for storage of covenant 
products. The fee harmonised the cost and consequently the Commission 
found that the agreement excluded price competition, even though the fee 
was just approximately 4% of total costs. It is quite possible that the 
agreement would be exempted if the surcharge were in form other than a 
fixed, flat rate charge, which would have been less restrictive.  
5.2.4 Fourth condition – No elimination of 
competition  
The aim of the final condition is to ensure that effective competition 
remains in the relevant market. The Article 101(3) Guidelines state, 
“ultimately the protection of rivalry and the competitive process is given 
priority over potentially pro-competitive efficiency gains which could result 
from restrictive agreements”.240 The Guidelines hold that rivalry between 
undertakings is an essential driver of economic efficiency, and that when 
competition is eliminated; short term gains will eventually be outweighed 
by long-term losses stemming from a lack of competition.241  
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In the 2001 Horizontal Guidelines, the Commission states that in relation to 
environmental agreements, “[w]hatever the environmental and economic 
gains and the necessity of the intended provisions, the agreement must not 
eliminate competition in terms of product or process differentiation, 
technological innovation or market entry in the short or, where relevant, 
medium run.”242 Kingston finds the Commission’s position reasonable; “[i]t 
is hard to conceive of a situation where total elimination of competition on 
an important competitive parameter would be indispensable to achieve the 
environmental aims of an agreement”. The elimination of competition can 
risk initiatives to innovate, which in the long run may undo the development 
of environmentally cleaner technology. 243  
5.3 Conclusion  
Article 101(3) TFEU is the key to integrate the Union’s environmental and 
competition policies. The Article 101(3) Guidelines does not explicitly 
exclude public policy from the Article 101(3) TFEU assessment. Paragraph 
42 states that all Treaty goals may be taken into account as far as they can 
be subsumed under the four conditions. Consequently, whether 
environmental benefits can be weighed against restrictions of competition 
under Article 101(3) TFEU depends on whether they fulfil the four 
cumulative conditions. This depends in particular on the interpretation of 
“technical and economic progress”, and “consumers” in the first and second 
condition. Where the environmental benefits resulting from the agreement 
lead to direct cost savings for individual consumers, there is little doubt that 
the environmental benefits can fulfil the first condition, even by the 
Commission’s new standard. The Commission has considered 
environmental concerns within Article 101(3) TFEU in past decisions. 
CECED shows that consumers might be interpreted widely, encompassing 
the aggregated cost benefit for the whole of society. It implies that even 
though the undertakings are unable to demonstrate that the consumers in the 
relevant market receive full compensation for the cost of the restrictions, the 
aggregated societal benefit may be taken into account.   
 
However, it is unclear if environmental benefits can be taken into account 
only where they can be calculated into economic benefits, such as cost 
savings, or if non-economical environmental benefits, such as ensuring the 
survival of an endangered species, might suffice. Monti interprets CECED 
and DSD as suggesting that environmental protection is becoming a core 
value of competition law, next to economic freedom, market integration, 
and efficiency.244 According to the Commission’s new approach expressed 
in the Article 101(3) Guidelines, however, this is very doubtful. The Article 
101(3) Guidelines demand objective economic benefits and economic 
efficiency. There have been no cases where non-economic environmental 
benefits have outweighed economic efficiency since the modernisation. 
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However, the Court of First Instance said in Métropole Télévision that 
public policy concerns might be taken into account under Article 101(3) 
TFEU, without mentioning that the benefits must be evaluated in economic 
terms.  
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6 Discussion and Final 
Conclusion 
6.1 Should environmental concerns be 
relevant in Article 101 TFEU? 
The constitutional structure of the Treaties demands that environmental 
concerns are to be taken into account under Article 101 TFEU. I firmly 
agree with the view that the Treaties form a coherent system, and that a 
holistic approach should be taken towards every Union goal. EU 
competition policy cannot be implemented in a vacuum, but must be 
consistent with other Treaty goals. The Union’s environmental objectives 
are expressed in Article 3 TEU, Article 11 TFEU and 191 TFEU. Policy-
linking clauses such as Article 11 TFEU pose concrete obligations to 
integrate environmental concerns into the Union’s policies. The existence of 
policy-linking clauses support the view that all judicial reasoning should be 
done coherently with the legal system as a whole. Conflicts arise within the 
Treaty between different Union goals because there is no set hierarchy 
among them. The aims set out in Article 3 TEU to achieve a delicate 
balance between social, environmental and economic goals require 
compromising. The wording in Article 101 TFEU is sufficiently open for 
interpretation to allow such compromising and the pursuit of different 
values. When Treaty provisions are open-textured enough, they should be 
interpreted to help in achieving all Union goals.  
 
The concept of having isolated policy areas within the Treaties, unaffected 
by other policies, seems contradictory to the structure of the Treaties. I do 
not believe in isolated goals where policy areas are divided, and where one 
policy’s success is achieved at the expense of another. If the Treaty meant 
for some objectives to be implemented in isolation, I would expect it to be 
expressly stated. It seems illogical to state several Union goals without a 
clear hierarchy in the same article if some goals were meant to overrule 
others. Unlike some policy areas in EU law, environmental policy goals 
cannot be achieved using a strict demarcation against other policy areas. 
Environmental policy must be integrated to become a part of every other 
policy area, if environmental decay should be halted. This is the role of the 
integration principle under Article 11 TFEU. The strong wording of Article 
11 TFEU, which states that environment protection “must” be integrated, 
poses an extensive obligation to integrate environmental concerns in other 
policy areas.  
 
The Treaties were built on ordoliberal values, which saw competition as a 
means to achieve a democratic and a humane society. According to 
ordoliberalism, competition is not an end in and of itself. All Union policies, 
including competition policy, rest in a constitutional framework and should 
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therefore be implemented with an integrated policy perspective. In cases of 
conflict between Union goals, the EU courts usually resolve these conflicts 
by compromising. The teleological interpretation method used by the EU 
courts is well known. When the EU courts construe provisions in the Treaty, 
they tend to regard the framework of the Treaty as a whole. The EU courts 
have, for example, clearly demonstrated an integrated approach and allowed 
exceptions from the goal of free movement of goods in Article 34 TFEU 
based on environmental concerns. While there is no firm case law that 
supports that environmental considerations should be taken into account 
under Article 101 TFEU, the EU courts have been open to include other 
public policy objectives under Article 101 TFEU in the past. The most 
prominent case is Métropole Télévision, where the Court of First Instance 
expressly stated that public interest could base an exemption under Article 
101 TFEU. Furthermore, in DSD, the Court of First Instance found that 
restrictions inherent in agreements aiming to achieve environmental goals 
were proportionate. 
 
Taking environmental concerns into account under Article 101 TFEU is 
rational according to neoclassic economic theory. If we accept the premise 
that the goal of EU competition law is to enhance consumer welfare and 
ensure efficient allocation of resources, environmental concerns should be 
taken into account because the environment is directly reflected in these 
values. The environment has both an instrumental and an intrinsic value. If 
we focus on the instrumental value, we can conclude that the environment is 
constantly providing us with services. We can also conclude that these 
services and resources are finite. Environmental degradation is consequently 
reducing societal welfare, which directly affects consumer welfare. External 
cost must be internalised in order for resources to be allocated efficiently. 
This is the essence of the Union’s official environmental policy, “polluter 
pays”. If we look exclusively at the allocation of resources on the relevant 
market, i.e. we accept the isolation principle, it may appear that the 
allocation is effective under workable competition, but in fact the consumers 
are enjoying products that are too cheap at the expense of society. 
Production will be too high and the real cost will be distributed on every 
human, which is realised in terms of increased environmental pressure. 
These costs must therefore be internalised through different means.  
 
We have seen that there are several instruments available for pursuing 
environmental objectives and for internalising external costs. Direct 
regulation, where the state legislates and enforces a prohibition, is suitable 
for certain environmental areas, but it is obvious that direct regulation 
cannot be the only instrument available for protecting the environment. It 
has been described as slow and inflexible to the ever-changing demands of 
industry. It is impossible for the state to enforce environmental protection in 
every industry. Direct regulation also fails to use the most powerful force, 
namely the market mechanism. This is the strong characteristic of the 
market-based instruments. A key feature of modern EU environmental 
protection is the private actor initiative, which most efficiently internalises 
the external costs. It is crucial that all sectors of society are allowed to work 
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towards improving the environment. The industry plays major role in 
realising an internalisation of environmental costs, and environmental 
protection.  
 
However, these kinds of instruments require EU competition enforcers to 
review their approach to competitive restrictive agreements. One of these 
market-based instruments is the voluntary environmental agreement. In the 
view of competition law, these agreements may restrict competition by 
increasing the market actors’ ability to reduce consumer surplus by raising 
prices, and reducing production and consumer choice. What they are doing 
in environmental economic terms is internalising costs that should be born 
by the relevant market in the first place. Therefore, it is crucial for our 
society that competition law is designed to allow for environmental benefits 
to be taken into account. A competition policy that completely ignores 
external effects will ultimately lead to economic deterioration.  
 
The Chicago School theory believes that the market force alone will 
maximise societal welfare. The state should not meddle in the affairs of the 
market. Political considerations should be left out of the competitive 
assessment; environmental protection is solely a matter for the state. The 
state should set the limits for what is environmentally acceptable, and then 
let competition roam free within those boundaries. The sole goal for 
competition is efficiency. The primary argument for this way of thinking is 
that it brings legal certainty; it is the only way to make competition law 
predictable. “No body of law can protect everything that people value. If 
antitrust could, we would need no other statutes”, to quote Bork. Even 
though Bork has a point, and it is a very attractive and simple way of 
thinking about competition law, this line of thought will ultimately ruin 
society. The Chicago School’s answer to external effects is to increase the 
use of state regulation. However, we have seen that the state is unable to 
enforce adequate environmental protection on all markets. Private initiative 
has become a key for environmental protection. However, it seems that the 
Chicago School would not allow cooperation between firms even though it 
would bring extensive environmental benefits. Legal certainty and 
predictability are important, but not the sole value a legal system should 
strive to achieve. Fairness, promotion of humanitarian goals, and coherence 
with other areas of law, are as important.  
 
Furthermore, I do not agree with the view expressed by Whish and Bailey 
that national courts and authorities would be ill placed to consider public 
policy objectives under Article 101 TFEU. I believe that national authorities 
are well suited to make sound judgements in each individual case. Arbitrary 
judgments and unpredictability can be avoided if the Commission provides 
clear and comprehensive guidelines. Furthermore, Directorate General 
Environment can contribute by issuing guidelines in creating common 
policies on evaluating environmental benefits. The new “economic 
approach” taken by the Commission, or more precisely by the Directorate 
General for Competition, implying that public policy concerns are irrelevant 
under Article 101 TFEU, is creating confusion because it is not justified on 
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any theoretical grounds. The Article 101(3) Guidelines neither reflect 
current jurisprudence, nor the Commissions own past decisional practises. 
In any event, the Commission cannot change the current legal situation with 
these guidelines. These guidelines are mere soft law and hold no legally 
binding effect. However, they do hold great normative effect, and they will 
without a doubt affect many coming decisions in the Member States. The 
uncertainty as to what extent environmental benefits may be taken into 
account is especially dire since 2004, when every national competition 
agency was entitled to grant exceptions under Article 101(3) TFEU. The 
confusion might very well result in fewer firms taking the initiative to 
reduce their environmental impact.  
 
The scope of the obligation conferred by Article 11 TFEU to integrate 
environmental protection is hard to define. It could be argued that 
restrictions of competition, necessary to internalise external costs to the 
relevant market, should always be allowed. When first faced with a 
potentially restrictive agreement, the Commission’s or a national 
competition agency, would begin with assessing the actual cost of the 
industry, and the relevant market. If the agreement had as its sole objective 
to internalise these costs, then it should be allowed under Article 101 TFEU, 
as a result of the integration principle under Article 11 TFEU. The positive 
effects of internalising costs will be that both consumers and producers will 
cut back on consumption due to more realistic prices. When full 
internalisation is achieved, the producers would truly start competing in 
delivering environmental friendly products. In the long run, competition 
would not be distorted, it would be as fierce as ever, only that consumer 
preferences would be different. The most environmentally effective 
company would win. However, full internalisation is still a utopian thought. 
It is also evident that the current competition law would not allow for such 
environmental agreements. Full internalisation would probably require 
environmental fees to be passed on to the consumers in the form of fixed 
surcharges. This is considered hardcore price fixing, and would almost 
always be prohibited by Article 101 TFEU, which was the case in VOTOB.  
 
Consequently, the scope of Article 11 TFEU remains uncertain. What 
should be certain is that environmental concerns should have a role in the 
Article 101 TFEU assessment.  
6.2 When should environmental concerns 
be relevant in Article 101(1) TFEU? 
I do not believe that environmental concerns are especially relevant under 
Article 101(1) TFEU. Even though environmental objectives are relevant 
under Article 101 TFEU, it does not mean that they should be considered all 
the time. Environmental benefits deriving from the agreement should only 
be taken into account under Article 101(3) TFEU. The bifurcated structure 
of Article 101 TFEU makes little sense if balancing is done in both Article 
101(1) TFEU and Article 101(3) TFEU. Consequently, environmental 
 55 
agreements should be assessed in the same way as any potentially restrictive 
agreement. This will render Article 101 TFEU more transparent and 
predictable.  
 
Consequently, I suggest that Article 101(1) TFEU merely entails a 
consumer welfare test on the relevant market. The central question should 
be if the agreement increases the parties’ ability to affect consumer welfare 
negatively by exercising market power. No other benefits should be taken 
into account, although the negative effects on the relevant market should be 
taken full account under Article 101(1) TFEU. An environmental agreement 
with the aim of internalising the cost of the relevant market will probably 
entail reduced competition between market actors, information exchange 
and price increases for consumers, which would result in a lower consumer 
surplus on the relevant market. Environmental agreements will therefore 
often infringe Article 101(1) TFEU.  
 
The 2001 Horizontal Guidelines showed that environmental agreements risk 
infringing Article 101(1) TFEU if they have a binding effect on the parties 
and the agreement encompasses a substantial part of the market. These 
factors are still relevant in the assessment under Article 101(1) TFEU 
because they directly affect the parties’ market power and their ability to 
negatively affect consumer surplus. However, the new “modernised” 
approach, adopted by the Commission towards competition law, should be 
taken into account. The 2001 Horizontal Guidelines reflect the old way, 
where “restriction of competition” was equated with the commercial 
freedom of the actors. The new approach focuses on the actual effects of the 
agreement in its economic context. I believe that the reason for extracting 
the chapter concerned with environmental agreements from the new 2010 
Horizontal Guidelines might have been its formalistic approach, which did 
not correspond to the new economic approach taken by the Commission.  
 
The bifurcated structure of Article 101 TFEU serves a procedural purpose. 
The burden of proof rests on the Commission or national competition 
agency to prove that an agreement infringes Article 101(1) TFEU. These 
institutions are in the best position to discern the anti-competitive effects on 
the relevant market. If it is found that Article 101(1) TFEU is infringed, the 
burden of proof shifts, and it is up to the concerned parties to show that the 
agreement fulfils the four conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU. The 
concerned parties are in the best position to show the positive effects of the 
agreement. This division of the burden of proof will result in a balanced and 
thorough review of the agreement in question.  
 
I see no need for relying on the ancillary restraint doctrine in relation to 
environmental agreements. This doctrine is extremely complicated. It 
appears that there is little consensus among scholars as to what the ancillary 
restraint doctrine entails when it comes to agreements with public policy 
objectives. Whish and Kingston seem to share the view that when it comes 
to performing an environmental regulatory task, it might be relevant. I do 
not believe that any kind of balancing should occur under Article 101(1) 
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TFEU. The ancillary restraint doctrine is very complex, and would render 
competition law very unpredictable. Furthermore, the ancillary restraint 
doctrine could serve as a way around the four cumulative conditions in 
Article 101(3) TFEU. It might prove easier to have an agreement accepted 
under Article 101(1) TFEU than Article 101(3) TFEU. Under the Article 
101(1) TFEU assessment, the parties are not obligated to show that the 
customers receive a fair share of the benefits, nor that effective competition 
remains on the relevant market. Furthermore, the burden of proof rests on 
the Commission in Article 101(1) TFEU. I believe that it is important that 
environmental agreements are carefully reviewed as environmental 
agreements may serve as suitable fronts for hidden cartels. The review of an 
agreement’s positive effects is best done under Article 101(3) TFEU, where 
the burden of proof rests on the undertakings and where they must meet 
each of the four conditions.  
  
One interesting aspect of the consumer welfare test is that it can be argued 
that environmental benefits may be taken into account naturally already in 
Article 101(1) TFEU. The consumers will experience reduced surplus, 
because suddenly they bear the full cost of the relevant market. However, 
the environmental benefits following the reduced environmental pressure 
will raise the consumer surplus. It might happen that the increase equates 
with the decrease, which would render the agreement as falling outside the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. However, this should normally not be the 
case. Environmental benefits will occur with delayed effect. Furthermore, an 
environmental agreement will also involve cooperation and information 
exchange between competitors. Focusing on the negative competitive 
effects on the relevant market will in most cases result in environmental 
agreements infringing Article 101(1) TFEU.     
 
Another interesting aspect of the consumer welfare test is that it could be 
argued that agreements that are environmentally disastrous, but otherwise 
not restrictive of competition, could infringe Article 101(1) TFEU due to the 
reduction in consumer surplus. EU competition law could consequently be 
used as an instrument not only to accept restrictive agreements that bring 
environmental benefits, but also to directly prohibit agreements that are bad 
for the environment. This is in line with the Harvard School theory, where 
competition law was seen as an instrument available to deal with market 
failures. However, I join Townley and Kingston in maintaining that this 
would go against the wording of the competition rules. Article 101 TFEU 
applies only in relation to “agreements … that have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition”. Consequently, 
Article 101(1) TFEU only applies when an agreement is restrictive of 
competition. Not until Article 101(1) TFEU has been infringed are we able 
to use Article 101(3) TFEU. Using competition law in another way would 
be undemocratic and a misuse of power. It would create a situation of 
unbearable uncertainty, where the Commission arbitrarily could deem an 
agreement prohibited under Article 101 TFEU, even though the agreement 
did not affect competition. Consequently, behaviour that is environmentally 
damaging, but does not harm competition, cannot be prohibited by EU 
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competition law. In these cases, environmental protection must be attained 
by direct regulation.  
 
6.3 When should environmental concerns 
be relevant in Article 101(3) TFEU?  
Environmental benefits should be taken fully into account under Article 
101(3) TFEU. As we have seen, the Treaty demands that environmental 
concerns are integrated into the competitive assessment. Furthermore, if EU 
competition policy should strive to enhance consumer welfare and efficient 
allocation of resources, it is rational to include environmental concerns. 
Consequently, the requirement in the first condition under Article 101(3) 
TFEU to improve “the production or distribution of goods” or to promote 
“technical or economical progress” should be interpreted to include 
environmental benefits, just like the Commission has done in past decisions.  
 
By saying “taken fully into account”, I mean first of all that the aggregated 
benefits to society as a whole should be weighed against the restrictions of 
competition on the relevant market. This is the only way to deal with 
external costs. The “pass-on” requirement under the second condition 
should, according to my view, simply entail that the consumers on the 
relevant market must “feel” some of the benefits arising from the agreement. 
It is consequently not necessary to show that the consumers on the relevant 
market have an individual positive rate of return from the benefits arising 
solely from the relevant market. We have seen that the Commission has 
already exercised this line of reasoning in CECED. As a result, if the 
aggregated benefits to society out-weigh the negative effects of competition 
in the agreement, the agreement fulfils the second condition. Of course, if 
we are to include all aggregated benefits under Article 101(3) TFEU, we 
must also take into account all aggregated negative effects of the agreement. 
Consequently, while the assessment under Article 101(1) TFEU only 
concerns the relevant market, the assessment under Article 101(3) TFEU is 
broadened to encompass the whole society.  
 
By “taken fully into account”, I also mean that not only should 
environmental benefits that are subsumed into “objective economic benefits” 
be taken into account, but also non-economic benefits. The teleological 
interpretation of the Treaty and the EU courts judgement in Métropole 
Télévision, do in no way imply that objective economic benefits are 
necessary for an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. This is the 
Commission’s view, and as long as new jurisprudence from the EU court 
says otherwise, the legal position is unchanged, no matter what soft law 
documents such as Article 101(3) Guidelines might say.  
 
However, in most cases, environmental benefits will in fact constitute 
“objective economic benefits”. Environmental benefits can be valued using 
the different indirect evaluation techniques developed in environmental 
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economics. Where the environmental benefit has a market price, such as fish 
or woodland, the evaluation is straightforward. When it comes to pollution 
and environmental damage, such as CO2 emissions, a cost-benefit analysis 
can be performed where the cost of reducing CO2 in the atmosphere is 
valued. Even where neither a market price nor where cost estimations can be 
utilised, there are still several alternatives for evaluating environmental 
goods, such as the revealed preference approach. Consequently, 
environmental benefits should, in most cases, be taken into account even 
with the Commission’s new standard, because in most cases the 
environmental benefits can be calculated into “objective economic benefits”. 
However, the difficulties in evaluating environmental benefits should not be 
underestimated. It might prove difficult to value the exact magnitude of an 
environmental benefit. Eco-systems are interrelated and negative/positive 
effects on one system can have a great impact on another system. The 
environment provides us with a manifold of services and a simple cost-
benefit analysis will often prove inadequate to quantify such gains. A 
related problem is that environmental effects often must be viewed long-
term, while anti-competitive effects are visible in the short-term. How are 
we to compare avoidance of future environmental disaster with present anti-
competitive effects? How much “environmental benefits” does it take to 
offset a loss of competitive effectiveness? A valid argument is that using 
environmental evaluation techniques, and balancing these benefits against 
efficiency losses, will make the Article 101 TFEU assessment uncertain and 
unpredictable. Nevertheless, one thing should be certain; preventing 
environmental damage is much less costly than restoring environmental 
damage. Cases such as CECED show that it is possible to balance positive 
and negative effects deriving from an environmental agreement. Even when 
environmental evaluation proves difficult, an approximation of the 
environmental benefits and the efficiency losses is far better than excluding 
environmental benefits altogether.  
 
What I have said so far does not imply that I find the competition goal as 
something that should be easily overridden. Economic efficiency remains 
the core goal of the EU competition law, and will only submit to 
environmental consideration where it is truly necessary. The third condition 
involves a proportionality test, and will be applied restrictively. The 
environmental agreement should be under close review in the Article 101(3) 
TFEU assessment. Environmental agreements may be misused and serve as 
fronts for hidden cartels. Just like in IAZ, the actual purpose with the 
agreement may be to establish entry barriers. It is in the third condition 
where the balancing of environmental benefits and restrictions of 
competition takes place. Restrictive agreements that are not indispensable 
for attaining the environmental goal should fail to fulfil this condition. 
Competition is the motor of economic progress, and no unnecessary 
restrictions should be allowed. I will not go as far as Townley and hold that 
in order for the restrictions to be indispensable for the attainment of the 
objectives, the objective must not be possible to be obtained by anyone in 
any other way, which includes other actors such as the state. This is going 
too far. I think that the third condition should be limited to test in what other 
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ways “the parties to the agreement” can attain the objective. If the parties 
can enter into a less restrictive agreement, which may achieve the same 
positive effect, then the restrictions are not indispensable. The fourth 
condition is the ultimate guardian of competition. No matter what 
environmental benefits the agreement might render, the elimination of 
competition on a substantial part of the relevant market will never be 
accepted.   
 
In closing, it is evident that there are plenty of ways in which competition 
and environmental goals can conflict. However, from what I have learned in 
writing this essay, is that competition law can be highly flexible and 
adaptable. Competition is a great and powerful mechanism, and can be used 
to achieve many societal goals. Competition law and environmental 
protection do not have to conflict but could instead reinforce each other. 
Competition law should not be a roadblock in the way of sustainable 
development, but a vehicle for achieving it. Vedder summarises my view by 
saying: “In the end we must ask our self what undistorted competition is 
worth if there is nothing left to compete for”.245 
                                                
245 Vedder (2003) p. 439.  
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